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Abstract
This Comment argues that Maori land claims will be bolstered through the use of existing and
emerging customary international law, including principles in the Declaration. Part I discusses land
issues in New Zealand, beginning by providing an overview of developments since the signing of
the Treaty of Waitangi (“Treaty”), the founding document of New Zealand. It then discusses
Maori customary title, the foreshore and seabed controversy, and the first settlement under the
F.S.A., and concludes with the reasons for New Zealand’s vote against the Declaration. Part II
reviews indigenous rights in international law and the role of international law in the New Zealand
judiciary. Part III argues that international law, including the Declaration, provides support for
successful claims of traditional land rights, especially those arising out of the F.S.A., and that
the principles of the Declaration are applicable in New Zealand domestic law regardless of New
Zealand’s official position on the Declaration.
COMMENT
INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS AND THE DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR MAORI LAND CLAIMS IN NEW ZEALAND
Sarah M. Stevenson*
INTRODUCTION
The rights of indigenous peoples worldwide were recog-
nized and affirmed by the international community on Septem-
ber 13, 2007, when the General Assembly of the United Nations
("U.N.") adopted, by overwhelming majority, the Universal Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ("Declaration").'
Only four States voted against the Declaration,2 and two have
since indicated a change in their position. One State that has
maintained its negative vote is New Zealand, where the Maori,
the tangata whenua, or indigenous peoples,4 currently make up
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; M.A. Candidate, 2009,
Fordham Graduate Program in International Political Economy and Development;
B.A., 2001, Scripps College. The author thanks Professor Jean-Marie Fenrich, Jorge
Contesse, Annie Chen, Ekaterina Napalkova, Louis Abrams, and Adam Masser for their
insightful comments and guidance.
1. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/
295, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Declaration]; see also Press
Release, General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Adopts Declaration on
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N.
Press Release] (stating that 143 countries voted in favor of the Declaration, four voted
against, and eleven abstained); S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The U.N. Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST LEGAL NEWS &
RESEARCH, Dec. 4, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-on-
rights-of-indigenous.php.
2. See generally U.N. Press Release, supra note I (recording votes against the Decla-
ration from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States ("U.S.")); Anaya &
Wiessner, supra note 1.
3. See U.N. Experts Welcome Canada's Backing For Indigenous Rights Declara-
tion, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Apr. 18, 2008, bttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?News
ID=26376&Cr-indigenous&Crl=rights (reporting Canada's House of Commons en-
dorsement of the Declaration); Call to Honour Indigenous Promise, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Syd-
ney, Austl.), Sept. 13, 2008, at 15 (stating that the Labour government said it would
support the Declaration but had yet to do so); see also H.R.J. Res. 1681, 123d Leg., 1st
Spec. Sess. (Me. 2008) (adopting an endorsement of the Declaration).
4. See Off. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Core Document Forming the Initial
Part of the Reports of States parties: New Zealand, U.N. Doc. HRI/CORE/NZL/2006, 36,
(Oct. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Core Document] (stating that Maori were established in
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approximately fourteen percent of New Zealand's population.5
New Zealand has long prided itself on support of and adherence
to the international human rights regime,6 as well as respect for
Maori rights within national law.7 The vote against the Declara-
tion brings New Zealand's relationship with its indigenous popu-
lation into the spotlight.
In international law, the concept of indiginenity8 refers to
the non-dominant people who lost traditional ownership and
power over their lands as part of the colonization process and
have historical continuity with the inhabitants of the same land
settlements throughout the islands that comprise New Zealand by the twelfth century,
and that the first Polynesians were believed to have arrived over a century earlier);
Douglas Graham, The New Zealand Government's Policy, in RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 3, 7 (Alison Quentin-Baxter ed., 1998) (referring to Maori as the
tangata whenua of New Zealand) (author was a Member of Parliament at the time of
publication).
5. See Off. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Seventy-First Session of the
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Overview and Up-
date on Developments Since December 2005: New Zealand 1 (July 31, 2007) http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/NZ_overview7 1.pdf (reporting 2006 census
figures for New Zealand as 67.6% European, 14% Maori, 9.2% Asian, 6.6% Pacific, and
11.1% "New Zealander") [hereinafter Overview and Update]; Jacqueline F. Pruner, Ab-
original Title and Extinguishment Not So "Clear and Plain": A Comparison of the Current Ma-
ori and Haida Experiences, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'VJ. 253, 263 (2005) (noting that Maori
are the only indigenous group recognized by New Zealand law).
6. See Claire Charters, Developments in Indigenous Peoples' Rights under International
Law and Their Domestic Implications, 21 N.Z.U.L.REv. 511, sec. 1 (2005) (noting that New
Zealand's government purports to be a strong supporter of international human
rights); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("BORA"), 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109 (providing
human rights protections under domestic law); Core Document, supra note 4, 53
(stating that New Zealand must observe international obligations, including human
rights).
7. See, e.g., Explanation of Vote by New Zealand Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, Rosemary Banks, Sept. 13, 2007, (on file with author) [hereinafter State-
ment of Banks] (proclaiming importance of Maori rights in New Zealand, and their
protection under domestic law); cf. Todd Ward, Turia: Maori Party Ashamed of N.Z. Fail-
ure on Rights, TARANAKI DAILY NEWS (N.Z.), Sept. 19, 2007, at 2 (quoting Maori Party co-
leader Tariana Turia saying the current government was changing course with their
lack of respect for Maori rights).
8. SeeJeremy Waldron, Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy, 1 N.Z.J. PuB. &
INT'L L. 55, § 1 (2003) (discussing the implications of different principles invoked when
discussing indigenous peoples and advancing the use of term "indigeneity"); see also
F.M. (JOCK) BROOKFIELD, WAITANGI & INDIGENOUS RGHTs: REVOLUTION, LAW & LEGITI-
MATION 77-78 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that defining indigenous can be difficult when the
group generally recognized as indigenous earlier displaced the actual original inhabi-
tants of the land, and stating that western imperialist countries are the only ones in-
cluded as foreign powers).
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prior to its invasion or colonization by a foreign power.9 World-
wide, there are 370 million indigenous peoples in at least seventy
countries.10 Due to the nature of indiginenity, indigenous peo-
ples have suffered many historical wrongs at the hands of the
foreign powers and, as a result, have valid claims against their
contemporary governments for redress of these wrongs."1 In
New Zealand, most of these claims relate to land that was occu-
pied and used by the indigenous populations before foreign in-
tervention.1 2
While New Zealand protects human rights with both domes-
tic and international law, Maori land rights are located almost
solely in domestic law.13 New Zealand's vote against the Declara-
tion was a reflection of the government's desire to limit the law
applicable to Maori land claims to domestic law, as the rights
stated in the Declaration are arguably broader than those in New
Zealand statutory law.14 As this Comment will explore, however,
the legal standards available to Maori land claimants may not be
so limited. The recent passage of the Foreshore and Seabed Act
2004 ("F.S.A.") 5 and settlements thereunder, provides a con-
9. See U.N. Dept. of Economic & Social Affairs, Workshop on Data Collection and
Disaggregation for Indigenous Peoples, The Concept of Indigenous Peoples, § 2, U.N. Doc
PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (2004); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
3-5 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that indigenous peoples are those that have been subject to
subjugation by a colonial power).
10. U.N. Press Release, supra note 1; Todd, supra note 7.
11. Anaya, supra note 9, at 5; see also Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indige-
nous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARv. HUM. RTS. J.
57, 93 (1999) (noting that indigenous communities occupy the "bottom rung" in most
countries and new avenues are being explored for remedying that position via domestic
and international laws).
12. See CHRISTA SCHOLTz, NEGOTIATING CLAIMS: THE EMERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS
LAND CLAIM NEGOTIATION POLICIES IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE
UNITED STATES 78 (2006) (noting that Maori claims are generally for reparative justice
based on the breach of the Treaty); Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Envi-
ronment-Based Cultures: The Emerging Voice of Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 23
WIS. INT'L L.J. 553, 555 (2005).
13. See Charters, supra note 6, § VI (noting that the New Zealand government's
actions towards Maori land rights seems generally uninformed by international law);
Paul Rishworth, The Treaty of Waitangi and Human Rights, [2003] N.Z.L.REv. 381, 381
(remarking that Treaty rights are not considered protected by international law).
14. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 1 (noting New Zealand's stated reasons for
voting against the Declaration included objections over the Declaration's statement on
land rights); Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (describing incompatibility of specific
articles in the Declaration with domestic law).
15. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 2004 S.N.Z. No. 93 [hereinafter F.S.A.] (plac-
ing title to all foreshore (beach) and seabed not privately owned in the government).
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temporary lens for viewing New Zealand's treatment of indige-
nous land claims.
This Comment argues that Maori land claims will be bol-
stered through the use of existing and emerging customary in-
ternational law, including principles in the Declaration. Part I
discusses land issues in New Zealand, beginning by providing an
overview of developments since the signing of the Treaty of
Waitangi ("Treaty")," the founding document of New Zealand.
It then discusses Maori customary title, the foreshore and seabed
controversy, and the first settlement under the F.S.A., and con-
cludes with the reasons for New Zealand's vote against the Decla-
ration. Part II reviews indigenous rights in international law and
the role of international law in the New Zealand judiciary. Part
III argues that international law, including the Declaration, pro-
vides support for successful claims of traditional land rights, es-
pecially those arising out of the F.S.A., and that the principles of
the Declaration are applicable in New Zealand domestic law re-
gardless of New Zealand's official position on the Declaration.
I. MA OR! AND THEIR TRADITIONAL LANDS: FROM THE
TREATY OF WAITANGI TO THE FORESHORE
AN SEABED ACT SETTLEMENTS
Land and resources are necessary to the survival of indige-
nous peoples,"v both as a matter of subsistence and of cultural
integrity.1 8 The history of the relationship between the New Zea-
land government and the Maori is the history of government
policy towards Maori and their lands.'" This Part will review this
history, beginning with the Treaty, the document that estab-
16. Treaty of Waitangi, U.K-Maori, Feb. 6, 1840, reprinted in PHILIP A. JOSEPH, CON-
STITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATvE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND § 3.3 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
Treaty].
17. See Anaya, supra note 9, at 141; see alsoJfirfmie Gilbert, Indigenous Rights in the
Making: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 14 INT'L J. ON
MINORITY AND GROUP RTS. 207, 223-24 (2007) (noting general consensus that land
rights are important to indigenous peoples apparent from the Declaration's emphasis
on land).
18. See Ani Mikaere et al., Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Land Rights, [2003]
N.Z.L.REv. 447, 460 (reporting on a Waitangi Tribunal report discussing the impor-
tance of land to Maori as "an internal part of self-identification" (quoting Waitangi
Tribunal, Ngati Awa Settlement Cross-Claims Report 84 WA, 958 (2002)); Erica-Irene A.
Daes, The Concepts of Self-Determination and Autonomy of Indigenous Peoples in the Draft Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 259, 264 (2001).
19. See generally Scholtz, supra note 12; Bryan Gilling, Raupatu: The Punitive Confis-
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lished British governance over New Zealand in the mid-nine-
teenth century, and continue to its most recent chapter, settle-
ments between the government and Maori groups under the
F.S.A.
A. The Treaty of Waitangi
The founding document of the New Zealand government is
the Treaty,2" signed in 1840 between the representatives of the
British Queen and over 500 Maori chiefs." Although not all Ma-
ori tribes were parties to the original treaty, it is now applied to
all Maori as official policy.22 The British government procured
the signatures of the chiefs to legally settle New Zealand and
purported to protect Maori property and culture from settlers.23
Maori were granted some rights under the new colonial govern-
cation of Maori Land in the 1860s, in LAND AND FREEDOM: LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
BRITISH DIASPORA 117, 117 (A.R. Buck et al. eds., 2001).
20. Treaty, supra note 16; see also Joseph, supra note 16, § 3.1 (stating that the
Treaty is generally considered the founding document of New Zealand); Core Docu-
ment, supra note 4, 74 (noting the Treaty established the legal basis for England's
settlement of New Zealand); Graham, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing the Treaty as a
founding document of New Zealand and comparing it to the Magna Carta as a histori-
cal document that can be used to instruct future relations); GEOFFREY PALMER & MAT-
THEW PALMER, BRIDLED POWER: NEW ZEALAND'S CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 333
(4th ed. 2004) (discussing the Treaty signing).
21. See New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General, [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641,
662 (CA) (stating that over 500 Maori chiefs signed the Treaty, including some women
chiefs); Joe Williams, Colonization Stories from Across the Pacific, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'YJ.
65, 1 4 (2006) (stating that 545 Maori chiefs signed the Treaty, mostly signing the Ma-
ori version); see also Heads of Agreement Relating to NgA Rohe Moana o Ngd Hapi o
Ngati Porou, Background, § A, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.justice.govt.nz/foreshore/ne-
gotiations/te-runanga-o-ngati-porou/agreement-february-2008/index.html [hereinaf-
ter Heads of Agreement] (noting that, prior to 1840, Ngati Porou owned all land within
their territory).
22. See Brookfield, supra note 8, at 105-06 (noting that all Maori are considered
parties to the Treaty whether or not their chief signed the Treaty in 1840); PETER
SPILLER ET AL., A NEW ZEALAND LEGAL HISTORY 130 (1995) (noting that failure to pro-
cure the signature of the totality of the Maori chiefs is disregarded); see generally Kirsty
Gover & Natalie Baird, Identifying the Maori Treaty Partner, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 39 (2002)
(providing a thorough discussion of the multiplicity of Maori groups and its impact on
the relationship formed by the Treaty).
23. See Palmer & Palmer, supra note 21, at 334 (stating that dual goals of the Treaty
were to preserve Maori culture and ease British settlement); Core Document, supra
note 4, 74 (stating that protection of Maori property rights was a Treaty goal); see also
Attorney General v. Ngati Apa, [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, 1 37 (CA) (noting that Britain
assumed Maori owned New Zealand's land, in contrast to the application of the terra
nullius theory during colonization of Australia).
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ment,24 but conflict exists as to the extent of the sovereignty the
Maori surrendered to the Crown due to differences in the mean-
ing of the language used in the English and Maori versions. 25
The Treaty has three articles: in Article I, the Maori chiefs cede
sovereignty in the English version, but kawanatanga (governor-
ship) in the Maori, to the British government; 26 in Article II, the
British government guarantees to the Maori "full, exclusive, and
undisturbed possession" or te tino rangatiratanga (full chieftan-
ship) of lands held collectively or individually;27 and in Article
III, Maori are guaranteed legal equality with New Zealanders of
British citizenship. 28 Article III has the same meaning in the En-
glish and Maori versions of the Treaty, 29 but Articles I and II
grant far more authority to the British government in the En-
glish version than in the Maori version.3 °
The Treaty, though never adopted as part of New Zealand's
positive law, is a very important document in New Zealand. 1
24. See New Zealand Maori Council, 1 N.Z.L.R. at 663 (noting that the Treaty, when
signed, was believed to guarantee Maori chieftainships and land ownership); see also
Palmer & Palmer, supra note 21, at 335-36 (stating that the Treaty created both substan-
tive and procedural rights for Maori in New Zealand's government, substantive rights
being the protection of Maori interests when balanced against government concerns,
and procedural rights being the fiduciary-like relationship between the Maori and the
Crown).
25. See New Zealand Maori Council, 1 N.Z.L.R. at 662-63 (quoting a literal translation
of the Treaty to demonstrate difference in text); Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, 1975
S.N.Z. No. 114 pmbl. (noting that English and Maori texts of the Treaty are different);
see also Pruner, supra note 5, at 264 (2005) (noting dispute over conflicts between lan-
guage in Maori and English versions of the Treaty has continued since 1840 signing of
the Treaty).
26. Treaty, supra note 16, art. I; see also PETER C. OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDEPENDENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
AND NEW ZEALAND 31 (2005) (discussing differences between sovereignty and governor-
ship).
27. Treaty, supra note 16, art. I; see also Erica-Irene A. Daes, Final Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 26,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (July 13, 2004) (describing tino rangatiratanga as
Maori sovereignty, and noting difference between possession and sovereignty).
28. Treaty, supra note 16, art. III; see also Palmer & Palmer, supra note 20, at 334;
Brookfield, supra note 8, at 98.
29. See Scholtz, supra note 12, at 77 (noting that Article III, guaranteeing equal
process to Maori, has never been in dispute); Palmer & Palmer, supra note 20, at 334.
30. SeeJoseph, supra note 16, § 3.4; Scholtz, supra note 12, at 77; Maui Solomon,
The Context for Maori (II), in RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 60, 67
(Alison Quentin-Baxter, ed. 1998) (stating that continued disagreement over the con-
tent of the Treaty is due to the translations used at the signings and arguing that Maori
chiefs who signed the Treaty believed they were retaining the right to self-governance).
31. See Anaya, supra note 9, at 188 (noting that Maori look to the Treaty as the
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While its validity as an international instrument is doubtful,3 2 the
Treaty established a relationship between the Maori and the
State government that is best understood as a partnership. 3
This partnership is implemented through legislation and a con-
stitutional convention that require the New Zealand government
to seek the consent of Maori groups before taking any action
which may directly affect Maori rights.34 These procedures are
underscored by an overarching requirement of both parties to
act in good faith to respect the principles of the Treaty. 5 Claims
for Treaty breaches, which often involve disputes over land, 6
most important constitutional document); Oliver, supra note 26, at 31 (referring to the
Treaty as an important historical document); Scholtz, supra note 12, at 90-91 (noting
that, although the National Party considered ratifying the Treaty in the 1970s, it re-
mains unincorporated); Charters, supra note 6, § V.A. (discussing the dualist system of
treaty incorporation).
32. SeeJoseph, supra note 16, § 3.2 (noting that many scholars consider the Treaty
an invalid cession under international law, but others argue that Maori did have sover-
eign standing under international law and the Treaty is valid); see also Brookfield, supra
note 8, at 99 (stating that even if the Treaty was formerly valid under international law,
it is no longer, as Maori chiefs do not have sovereign status).
33. See Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, 1975 S.N.Z. No. 114, art. 4(2) (A) (a) (referring
to the Treaty parties as partners); New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General
[1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 664 (CA) (stating that the Treaty created a partnership); see also
Heads of Agreement, supra note 21, Letter of Understanding (stating that agreement
was formed between partners, as equals and in good faith). But see Palmer & Palmer,
supra note 20, at 336 (discussing fiduciary relationship created by the Treaty).
34. See Human Rights Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. No. 82, § 5(2) (D) (amended 2001)
(listing understanding human rights components of the Treaty in light of national and
international law as a function of the Human Rights Commission); State Owned Enter-
prise Act 1986, 1986 S.N.Z. No. 124, § 6 (requiring the government to observe the prin-
ciples of the Treaty when acting under the mandate of the statute); Geoffrey Palmer,
The New Zealand Constitution and the Power of Courts, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 551, 568-69 (2006) (discussing the thirty statutes that incorporate the Treaty); see
alsoJoseph, supra note 16, § 1.4.8 (describing constitutional conventions as a non-statu-
tory rule of political obligation); S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indige-
nous Peoples: The Move Toward the Multicultural State, 21 Aiuz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 13, 52-
60 (2004) (discussing importance of a consultative process to the preservation of indig-
enous rights and the incorporation of a consent principle into international documents
such as the World Bank Operational Directive 4.20). But see New Zealand Maori Council, 1
N.Z.L.R. at 665 (stating that a general duty to consult was unworkable when it was un-
clear who to consult and whose rights would be violated).
35. See Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, art.4(2) (A) (a) (describing parties in partner-
ship); Heads of Agreement, supra note 21 (noting importance of good faith in Treaty-
related agreements).
36. See Andrew Sharp, Blood, Custom, and Consent: Three Kinds of Maori Groups and
the Challenges They Present to Governments, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 9, 11-12 (2002) (identify-
ing three types of claims Maori most commonly bring against the State as those seeking
to better their socio-economic position, redress for historical wrongs, and infringe-
ments on Maori autonomy); see also Scholtz, supra note 12, at 74-75 (noting the Treaty
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may be resolved by the Waitangi Tribunal37 ("Tribunal") or in
official settlement negotiations with the government.38
B. Maori Customary Title and the Foreshore and Seabed Act
The Waitangi Tribunal and official settlement process exist
to resolve land disputes under the Treaty. Maori land rights also
exist in the doctrine of indigenous title, or Maori customary title,
which creates legal title in lands traditionally occupied by indige-
nous peoples. 9 Maori customary title, although lost to most of
New Zealand's land in the years following the signing of the
Treaty,4 ° is formally recognized by Te Ture Whenua Maori Act,
established Maori had rights to all of what became the British colony, and claims arose
from the Treaty).
37. Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (giving the Tribunal jurisdiction over claims by
Maori alleging prejudicial effect by any government action inconsistent with the Treaty,
and empowering the Tribunal to make recommendations); Treaty of Waitangi Amend-
ment Act 1985, 1985 S.N.Z. No. 148 (extending the Tribunal's jurisdiction to 1840);
Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 2006, 2006 S.N.Z. No. 077 (creating 2008 deadline
for historical Treaty claims); see also Palmer & Palmer, supra note 20, at 336, 338 (noting
that the Treaty of Waitangi Act creating the Tribunal was passed in 1975, but the Tribu-
nal was not established until 1977 and noting that the Tribunal can order publically
held land be returned to claimants but that power has not been exercised); Overview
and Update, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that, due to most claims being settled, Parlia-
ment set a 2008 deadline for filing historical claims with the Waitangi Tribunal).
38. See Core Document, supra note 4, 76, 78, 80 (noting that, as of June 2005,
New Zealand had entered into eight Treaty settlements, with six completed through
legislation, for NZ $709 million and that Office of Treaty Settlements was established in
1995 in Ministry ofJustice to advise the government on Treaty issues and negotiate on
behalf of the Crown, and reciting six principles of Treaty negotiation set forth by the
government); see also Scholtz, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that land claim negotiations
are both symbolically and substantively important, in that government is acknowledging
validity of claims and Maori as equal bargaining partners);Joseph, supra note 16, § 3.9.1
(stating that the negotiation process is intended to avoid time and cost of a Tribunal
hearing); see generally Scholtz, supra note 12 (providing a thorough discussion of land
settlement policies).
39. See Andrew Erueti, Translating Maori Customary Title into a Common Law Title,
[2003] N.Z.LJ. 421, 421 (describing customary title as concept in common law coun-
tries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. that holds title of indigenous
peoples continued to exist following assumption of sovereignty by England); Brook-
field, supra note 8, at 51-52 (defining doctrine of aboriginal title to locate property
rights held by indigenous populations after a foreign government has become sover-
eign, except where the government acquired land by seizure, purchase, or otherwise).
40. See Erueti, supra note 39, at 421 (stating that most Maori customary title to land
was extinguished by 1900, due to sales, confiscation, and decisions by the Maori Land
Court); Spiller et al., supra note 22, at 132-54 (discussing various ways by which the
Crown and British settlers obtained title to most of New Zealand's land); Wiessner,
supra note 11, at 70-71 (discussing Maori loss of land to colonial power).
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the Maori Land Act of 1993 ("Maori Land Act"). 4 ' The Maori
Land Act empowers the Maori Land Court to find that Maori
customary title exists when land is held following tikanga Maori,
Maori customary values and practices.4 2 Due to the extinguish-
ment of Maori customary title, however, the theory has been of
little value in Maori efforts to regain traditional lands.4
Maori customary title to the foreshore and seabed, however,
continued to exist despite its termination inland.44 In 2003, in
Attorney General v. Ngati Apa,4" the Court of Appeal held that Ma-
ori customary title to the foreshore and seabed of New Zealand
may exist, as it was not extinguished by prior government act.4 6
The court found that no prior general legislation had extin-
guished the customary title to the foreshore and seabed, 47 revers-
ing a prior judgment that had held otherwise.48 As a result of
this ruling, Maori had the right to bring claims for customary
title to the foreshore and seabed to the Maori Land Court.49
41. Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 (Maori Land Act 1993), 1993 S.N.Z. No. 4, 1
129 (2) (a) [hereinafter Maori Land Act 1993); see also Spiller et al., supra note 22, at
168-69 (noting that Maori Land Act 1993 had goal of achieving Maori land retention
and use).
42. Maori Land Act 1993, 1 129; see also Pruner, supra note 5, at 263-64 (noting
that Maori Land Act 1993 requires tikanga Maori to exist at time of claim).
43. See Pruner, supra note 5, at 266 (stating that land acts passed by colonial and
New Zealand governments between 1862 and 1993 extinguished Maori customary tide);
Scholtz, supra note 12, at 77-78 (noting that most government acts served to extinguish
Maori customary title to land).
44. See Erueti, supra note 39, at 421 (noting that customary title to foreshore and
seabed survived as assertable claim despite extinguishment of such claims to most
land); cf Paul McHugh, Setting the Statutory Compass: The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 3
N.Z. J. PUB. & INr'L L. 255, § I (2005) (noting that Ngati Apa held that customary title
"might" exist).
45. Attorney General v. Ngati Apa, [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643 (CA).
46. See Ngati Apa, 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, at 11 88, 91 (finding Maori Land Court had
jurisdiction over claims of customary title to the foreshore and seabed); see also Erueti,
supra note 39, at 421, 423 (discussing Ngati Apa decision giving the Maori Land Court
jurisdiction over foreshore and seabed claims, with the power to convert Maori custom-
ary title into Maori freehold title if held according customary title as set forth in the
Maori Land Act 1993); see generally Mikaere et al., supra note 18 (discussing Ngati Apa
and other recent decisions affecting Maori land rights before the passing of the F.S.A.).
47. Ngati Apa, 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, at 1 83.
48. Ngati Apa, 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, at 1 87 (reversing In re the Ninety Mile Beach [1963]
N.Z.L.R. 261 (CA)); see also Brookfield, supra note 8, at 189-90 (noting that Ngati Apa
overturned In re the Ninety Mile Beach, which denied existence of customary Maori title).
49. Ngati Apa, [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, at 91; see also Pruner, supra note 5, at 279
(noting that the Ngati Apa holding did not establish customary Maori tide to foreshore
and seabed but rather that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction over such claims).
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Official reaction to the decision was swift.50 Public and gov-
ernment concern that the Ngati Apa decision would result in the
loss of public beach access and adversely affect private marine-
based industries caused Parliament to pass legislation to over-
turn the holding.5" The F.S.A. preemptively extinguished the
Maori customary title that the Court of Appeal found may exist
in the foreshore and seabed by vesting all title that was not held
in fee simple in the government 52 and removed Maori Land
Court jurisdiction to hear claims of title to the foreshore and
seabed filed before the enactment of the F.S.A
The F.S.A. does not guarantee a right to redress, but instead
allows applications for the recognition of territorial customary
rights to the High Court or a customary rights order to the Ma-
ori Land Court.54 Rather than having jurisdiction to grant free-
hold title to these lands using the doctrine of Maori customary
title, as contemplated by the Ngati Apa court, a customary rights
order allows the Maori Land Court to protect rights and uses but
50. See Claire Charters & Andrew Erueti, Report from the Inside: The CERD Commit-
tee's Review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 36 Vcr. U. WELLINGrON L. REv. 257,
§ III.A.2 (2005) (noting announcement of intention to introduce legislation overturn-
ing Ngati Apa decision within days of ruling); Mikaere et al., supra note 18, at 471; see
also Deed of Agreement, Nga Hapu 0 Ngati Porou and Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of New Zealand, initialed Aug. 7, 2008, § D, http://www.justice.govt.nz/foreshore/ne-
gotiations/te-runanga-o-ngati-porou/deed.html [hereinafter Deed of Agreement] (re-
citing government introduction of legislation to overturn Ngati Apa decision).
51. See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People 47, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2006/78/Add.3 (Mar. 13, 2006) (noting that the F.S.A. was Parliament's reaction to the
Ngati Apa decision); Brookfield, supra note 8, at 191-92 (stating that reasons for the
F.S.A. included government and Pakeha concern over use of sea and beach for recrea-
tion, concern the Maori Land Court would convert foreshore and seabed into Maori
freehold tide and fear that marine development would be adversely affected); Charters,
supra note 6, § II (noting the F.S.A. was Parliament's response to NgatiApa decision); cf.
Mikaere et al., supra note 18, at 462 (characterizing Maori reaction to decision as one of
relief).
52. F.S.A., supra note 15, § 13; see also Charters, supra note 6, § II; Stavenhagen,
supra note 51, 52 (describing F.S.A. as a unilateral extinguishment of Maori custom-
ary tide claims to the foreshore and seabed).
53. F.S.A., supra note 15, §§ 12, 46; see also Charters, supra note 6, § II.
54. F.S.A., supra note 15, §§ 32-90; see also McHugh, supra note 44, § II (explaining
that territorial customary rights refer to exclusivity in the use and occupation of the
foreshore and seabed that would have been recognized at common law, and that cus-
tomary rights orders recognize non-exclusive, use-based rights); Charters & Erueti,
supra note 50, § III.B.4 (arguing that the F.S.A. provided only a possibility of redress,
such as recognition of property rights or compensation, not a guaranteed right to re-
dress).
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requires the denial of legal ownership.55 The standard of proof
to obtain a customary rights order is as high as to prove Maori
customary title, but the result is less than ownership. 6
To receive a customary rights order, the Maori claimants
must prove that, in the absence of the F.S.A., they would have
had a claim of Maori customary title to the foreshore and seabed
areas.57 Upon the granting of an order by the Court of Appeal,
the government must conduct negotiations with the Maori
group for redress, and any agreement reached would be subject
to Cabinet approval and Parliament's allocation of funds for its
enactment.58 Any settlement negotiation would result in the
granting of territorial customary rights, and would take into ac-
count the rights of any third parties that may be affected,59 and
no action taken by the collective rights holders with relation to
the foreshore and seabed would be free from government re-
view.6  The one settlement currently completed under the
F.S.A. is discussed below.
Maori reaction to the F.S.A. was critical, as foreclosing Ma-
ori customary title to the foreshore and seabed was viewed as an
unnecessary reaction on the part of the New Zealand govern-
ment.6 Certain Maori groups filed a complaint objecting to the
55. F.S.A., supra note 15, §§ 42, 52; see also Charters & Erueti, supra note 50,
§ III.B.4.
56. See Stavenhagen, supra note 51, 52 (stating that the F.S.A. allows redress only
by difficult to obtain court orders for protection of customary uses and practices); see
also Charters, supra note 6, § VI (noting that tests are difficult to show).
57. F.S.A., supra note 15, §§ 32-90; see also Heads of Agreement, supra note 21, Fact
Sheets, Context of Agreement, 5 (describing two-part test for receiving government
confirmation of territorial customary rights requiring, from 1840 to 2004, continuous
customary title to land adjacent to foreshore and use and occupation to exclusion of
others without substantial interruption). But see McHugh, supra note 44, § I (arguing
that such title could not be shown at common law).
58. F.S.A., supra note 15, §§ 33, 36-38, 40-44; Charters, supra note 6, sec. II; see also
McHugh, supra note 44, § I (discussing that Maori were opposed to listing rights that
could be protected by the F.S.A., preferring instead to pursue use the F.S.A. as a legal
avenue for protection of mana, the traditional relationship with the land, including
control of the land).
59. F.S.A., supra note 15, §§ 7, 8; see also Statement of Position and Intent: Fore-
shore and Seabed Negotiations between the Crown and Te Runanga o Ngati Porou
(2005) § 20, http://www.justice.govt.nz/foreshore/negotiations/te-runanga-o-ngati-po
rou/agreement-february-2008/index.html (stating that agreement must be administra-
tively convenient and consider rights of third parties).
60. F.S.A., supra note 15, § 56; see also Statement of Position and Intent, supra note
59, § 33 (guaranteeing government ability to overrule hapu (sub-tribe) decisions).
61. See U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Decision
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U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
("CERD"), arguing that the F.S.A. violated the Convention of the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination's prohibition
on racial discrimination by treating Maori property rights differ-
ently from non-Maori property rights.6 2 The CERD found that
the F.S.A. discriminated against Maori by treating Maori prop-
erty rights different from those of non-Maori, extinguishing Ma-
ori customary title to the foreshore and seabed, and by failing to
provide a guaranteed right to redress. 6' The CERD agreed that
the New Zealand government did not explore other potential
solutions.6 4 The government rejected CERD's findings and de-
clared that no changes would be made based on the decision,
implying that the CERD report was not important and CERD did
not fully grasp the complexity of the issue or the government
response.65
1(66), New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 1 5 U.N. Doc. CERD/C/66/NZL/
Dec.1, 5 (April 27, 2005) [hereinafter CERD decision] (noting large scale Maori op-
position to the F.S.A.); see also Brookfield, supra note 8, at 192 (noting that Maori pro-
tested the F.S.A. before it was passed); Charters & Erueti, supra note 50, § III.A.2 (dis-
cussing critical reaction to the F.S.A. upon its introduction, including a Waitangi Tribu-
nal report); Pruner, supra note 5, at 285-86 (concluding that non-Maori access to and
use of the foreshore and seabed would not be precluded by allowing Maori increased
control over areas to engage in customary use and practice). But see McHugh, supra
note 44, § I (arguing benefits of the F.S.A. allowed Maori mana to be rooted in legal
system, something that was never guaranteed under common law); Muriel Newman,
Mhen Radicals Agree, New Zealand Centre for Political Research, Feb. 15, 2008, http://
www.scoop.co.nz/stories/P00802/S00178.htm (expressing view that the F.S.A. was ben-
eficial to Maori and discriminatory against non-Maori).
62. See CERD Decision, supra note 61, 1 (noting that complaint was reviewed
under early warning and urgent action procedure, after receiving information from the
New Zealand government and NGOs representing Maori); see generally Charters &
Erueti, supra note 50 (discussing their arguments in front of U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination ("CERD").
63. CERD Decision, supra note 61, 1 6 (stating that extinguishment of Maori claim
to customary title over the foreshore and seabed discriminated against Maori); see also
Stavenhagen, supra note 51, 43 (noting that CERD had found the F.S.A. discriminates
against Maori by extinguishing customary title and failing to provide a right of redress);
cf Charters, supra note 6, § VI (stating that the F.S.A. breaches New Zealand's interna-
tional law obligations, such as CERD General Recommendation 23, which requires
States to provide compensation where restitution is impossible).
64. CERD Decision, supra note 61, 4 (stating that the government failed to prop-
erly consider other methods of resolving Ngati Apa reaction); cf Deed of Agreement,
supra note 50, § Q (noting that Ngati Porou hapu remains opposed to the F.S.A.); An-
nie Mikaere, Settlement of Treaty Claims: Full and Final, or Fatally Flawed?, 17 N.Z.U.L.REv.
425 (1997) (questioning the finality of Treaty claim settlements and the logic of enter-
ing into full and final settlement agreements).
65. See MoanaJackson, The United Nations on the Foreshore: A Summary of the Report of
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International and domestic criticism of the F.S.A. befell the
government from other arenas as well. The U.N. Special Rap-
porteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples reviewed the F.S.A. and found
it to be a regression in New Zealand's recognition of Maori
rights under previously completed treaty settlements. 66 The New
Zealand Human Rights Commission expressed concern that the
F.S.A. extinguished customary title to the foreshore and seabed,
but also noted the positive aspects of the F.S.A., such as the pro-
tection of beach access, important to most New Zealanders.67
Although the F.S.A. does not provide a guaranteed right to
redress, it does contain a remedy provision, of which Maori
groups were quick to take advantage. 6' The first settlement
agreement under the F.S.A. was reached in August 2008,69 be-
tween the government and the hapu7 ° of Ngati Porou.7 The
Deed of Agreement, based on Heads of Agreement signed in
February 2008, must now be approved by the Ngati Porou hapu,
confirmed by the High Court,7 2 and implemented by legisla-
the Special Rapporteur, April 5, 2006, http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mj050406.htm;
Charters & Erueti, supra note 50, § IV.I (discussing the government's rejection of the
decision, and contrasting it with New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the
United Nations statement declaring New Zealand's commitment to defending human
rights).
66. See Stavenhagen, supra note 51, 55 (finding the F.S.A. to be a "step back-
ward" for Crown recognition of Maori rights).
67. New Zealand Human Rights Comm'n, Submission on the Foreshore and Sea-
bed Bill (July 12, 2004), http://www.hrc.co.nz/home/hrc/newsandissues/foreshore-
andseabedbill.php; see also Stavenhagen, supra note 51, 1 49 (discussing analysis of New
Zealand Human Rights Commission).
68. See Press Release, Te Runanga o Ngati Porou, Another Key Step in Takutai
Moana Negotiations (Aug. 8, 2008) (on file with author) (stating that the hapu contin-
ues to object to the F.S.A. but entered into settlement to ensure protection of rights);
New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Foreshore and Seabed Negotiations (June 23, 2008),
http://www.justice.govt.nz/foreshore/negotiations/index.html (stating that the gov-
ernment is in F.S.A. negotiations with five hapu); Yvonne Tahana, SeachangeforForeshore
Law, THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Mar. 1, 2008, at A06 (noting that less than ten tradi-
tional rights orders have been filed with the Maori Land Court).
69. Deed of Agreement, supra note 50; see also Tahana, supra note 68 (noting that
settlement involved 289 km of coast, 90% of which owned by Ngati Porou hapu).
70. See Sharp, supra note 36, at 15 (defining hapu as sub-tribe and iwi as tribe);
Glossary, RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES xvii-xviii (Alison Quentin-
Baxter, ed. 1998).
71. Deed of Agreement, supra note 50 (noting settlement was conducted in accord
with the F.S.A.); see also Tahana, supra note 68 (noting that settlement the first under
the F.S.A.).
72. The New Zealand High Court is the court of general jurisdiction that hears
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tion.73 The settlement recognized the continued mana, the "au-
thority, control, influence, prestige and power on one hand, and
psychic force on the other,"7 4 of the Ngati Porou to the fore-
shore and seabed area in question as a collective right.75 This
right entails the right to conduct and regulate activities on, over
or within the foreshore and seabed, and to exercise influence
over private actors in, or with an impact on, the foreshore and
seabed.76 Ngati Porou's rights are clearly limited in the settle-
ment agreement: they do not confer legal or equitable title to
the foreshore and seabed areas comprised in the settlement,71
and any action taken by the hapu is subject to legislative action.78
Interests of the general public remain protected, 79 reflecting the
impetus behind the F.S.A. to guarantee public use of the fore-
shore and seabed.80
seriousjury trials and civil and administrative cases. See Core Document, supra note 4,
65.
73. See generally Deed of Agreement, supra note 50; Press Release, Te Runanga o
Ngati Porou, supra note 68; Press Release, New Zealand Government, Foreshore and
Seabed Deed of Agreement (Aug. 7, 2008) (on file with author).
74. Law Comm'n, Te Aka Matua 0 Te Ture, Maori Customs and Values in New Zea-
land Law, Study Paper 9, 137 (March 2001); see also id., 13749 (discussing mana,
including mana wahine, women's power within community).
75. See Deed of Agreement, supra note 50, 5, 6 (stating that the deed protects
the territorial customary rights and exercise of mana by Ngati Porou); see also Tahana,
supra note 68 (stating that the agreement provides protection of customary activities,
such as fishing, as well as increased management powers); Govt, Ngati Porou Strike Deal,
TVNZ (Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author) (noting that Dr. Apirana Mahuika, spokes-
man for Ngati Porou, stated that reaffirmation of mana with the land was settlement
goal, not financial compensation).
76. Deed of Agreement, supra note 50, § 6; see also Tahana, supra note 68 (noting
that the Agreement will allow for more local control of activities such as fishing).
77. Heads of Agreement, supra note 21, Schedule 5: Extent of Legal Expression,
Protection and Recognition of Mana, § 2.1.a.i.
78. Heads of Agreement, supra note 21, Schedule 5: Extent of Legal Expression,
Protection and Recognition of Mana, § 2.1.c.i-iii (stating that right to mana cannot
impact or override any legislation, or affect rights of any person); id., § 2.1.e.iii.A (stat-
ing that mana will not infringe on the government "performing its functions, duties and
powers"). But see Newman, supra note 61 (stating that Ngati Porou settlement will pre-
vent other New Zealanders from enjoying beaches and will lead to government pay-
ments to Maori).
79. See Press Release, New Zealand Government, supra note 73 (stating the Deed
of Agreement protects the general public's foreshore and seabed access); Tahana, supra
note 68 (noting that the beach will remain open for all to use and quoting an elder
stating that settlement will change nothing for himself or his hapu).
80. See Charters, supra note 6, § II (noting the F.S.A. was Parliament's response to
concern over public beach access after the NgatiApa decision); Stavenhagen, supra note
51, 47 (discussing passage of F.S.A. to protect public access to foreshore and seabed).
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In sum, the Ngati Porou settlement is significant in that it
protects the hapu's mana and customary rights to the foreshore
and seabed area. The settlement agreement affirms the good
faith of the deed negotiations as required by the partnership
principle underlying the Treaty,81 and the government's obliga-
tions to international law in its duties under the settlement.8 2
The Ngati Porou, however, continue to oppose the F.S.A. and its
bar on ownership.83 The recognition and protection of the set-
tlement, however, falls short of the ownership that was feasible
under the doctrine of Maori customary title, and does not ad-
dress the criticism of the CERD decision that the F.S.A. treats
Maori property rights differently from those of non-Maori.
C. Land and New Zealand's Vote Against the Declaration
New Zealand's concern over issues related to land owner-
ship were displayed in the international arena at the adoption of
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The adop-
tion of the Declaration is the strongest international statement
to date on indigenous rights,84 coming over twenty years after
the decision of the U.N. to investigate indigenous rights.85 New
Zealand played a large role in drafting the Declaration,86 as did
indigenous peoples, including Maori.87 New Zealand was one of
81. Deed of Agreement, supra note 50, § 1.1, princ. 4.
82. Deed of Agreement, Schedule Two, §§ 2.2-2.3, http://www.justice.govt.nz/
foreshore/negotiations/te-runanga-o-ngati-porou/deed/schedule-2.pdf (reciting obli-
gation of Minister of Justice to comply with international obligations, including those
relating to the environment).
83. See Deed of Agreement, supra note 50, § Q Press Release; see generally Te
Runanga o Ngati Porou, supra note 68; Press Release, New Zealand Government, supra
note 73.
84. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 1 (stating that 143 Member States voted in
favor of the Declaration and four voted against, with eleven abstentions); Anaya &
Wiessner, supra note 1.
85. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 1 (noting negotiations that resulted in the
Declaration began nearly twenty-five years prior); Graham, supra note 4, at 3-4 (discuss-
ing process, beginning in 1982, creating Declaration, adopted by the Human Rights
Council in June 2006).
86. See Statement of Banks, supra note 7; Anaya, supra note 9, at 64, 221 (stating
that New Zealand, along with Australia and Canada, played a large role in drafting the
Declaration and noting that, although no country was required to issue reports to the
working group, New Zealand did so on a regular basis).
87. See Erica-Irene A. Daes, Equality of Indigenous Peoples under the Auspices of the
United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv.
493, 494 (1995); Press Release, U.N. Perm. Forum on Indigenous Issues, Statement of
Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Chair of the U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues on
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only four States that voted against the Declaration.8" Its vote
against the Declaration resulted from an official position that,
although most of the standards elucidated in the Declaration
were already in practice in New Zealand,"9 four provisions, pri-
marily relating to land, are incompatible with New Zealand
law.90
The four provisions to which New Zealand specifically ob-
jected relate to land, which the government perceives to be
stronger than those provided for in New Zealand law." t Specifi-
cally, the four provisions are: Article 19, directing States to con-
sult and cooperate with and gain the consent of indigenous
populations before taking legislative acts that may affect them; 2
Article 26, reciting indigenous peoples' right to own, use, de-
the Occasion of the Adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, Sept. 13, 2007, U.N. General Assembly, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/
unpfii/en/declaration.html [hereinafter Statement of Tauli-Corpuz] (noting that the
Declaration was drafted by rights holders); Graham, supra note 4, at 20 (noting impor-
tant role Maori contingencies played in drafting the Declaration); Te Atawhai Taiaroa,
The Context far Maori (I), in RECOGNISING THE RiGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 54, 57
(Alison Quentin-Baxter, ed. 1998) (stating that Maori made a large contribution to the
Draft Declaration).
88. See UN Press Release, supra note 1 (stating that States voting against the Decla-
ration were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S.); see also Phil Fontaine, Cana-
dian Vote Left Stain on Country's Reputation, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 26, 2007, at 8 (noting
that Canada's vote against the Declaration will damage country's reputation as human
rights leader).
89. See Alison Quentin-Baxter, The International and Constitutional Law Contexts, in
RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 22, 32 (Alison Quentin-Baxter, ed.
1998) (stating that main concepts in the Declaration, autonomy and participation in
decision-making, are "parallel" to those in the Treaty); U.N. Press Release, supra note 1
(noting position of New Zealand government that it "had been implementing most of
the standards in the Declaration for many years.").
90. See Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (describing vote against the Declaration as
premised on perceived incompatibility of Articles 19, 26, 28, and 32); see also Statement
by Clive Pearson, Representative of New Zealand, on behalf of Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States of America on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, May 17, 2006, http://www.mfat.gov.nz/
Media-and-publicaitons/Media/MFAT-speeches/2006/0-1 7-May/2006.php (stating
that concerns of Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. were greatest regarding land
provisions).
91. See Graham, supra note 4, at 11 (noting government concern over extension of
Maori land rights beyond those recognized in New Zealand law and Treaty land settle-
ments); Pruner, supra note 5, at 287-88 (noting that the Declaration provides indige-
nous peoples with stronger rights to traditional lands, and would thereby provide Maori
with a much stronger claim against the government).
92. Declaration Article 19 states:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain
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velop and control their traditional lands;9' Article 28, stating
that indigenous peoples have a right to redress, prioritizing resti-
tution of land over compensation; 94 and Article 32 (2), emphasiz-
ing the rights of Article 19 in regard to land.95 New Zealand
objected to Articles 26 and 28 because, theoretically, the entire
country would fall under the provisions of recognition and re-
dress, and because Article 28 prioritized redress in the form of
restitution over redress by compensation.96 Articles 19 and
32 (2) caused concern due to the perceived implication of a veto
right for the indigenous population97 and for their effect on pri-
their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing leg-
islative or administrative measures that may affect them.
Declaration, supra note 1, art. 19.
93. Declaration Article 26 states:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owner, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the
lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional own-
ership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have
otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories
and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the
customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples con-
cern.
Declaration, supra note 1, art. 26.
94. Declaration Article 28 states:
1. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to redress, by means that can in-
clude restitution or, when this is not possible,just, fair and equitable compen-
sation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated,
taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed con-
sent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensa-
tion shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size
and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.
Declaration, supra note 1, art. 28.
95. Declaration Article 32(2) states:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting
their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other re-
sources.
Declaration, supra note 1, art. 32(2)
96. See Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (describing objection of New Zealand to
Articles 26 and 28 as unworkable and potentially affecting the entire country); U.N.
Press Release, supra note 1.
97. See generally Statement of Banks, supra note 7, (discussing Crown's position that
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vate landowners.9"
In addition to these specific objections, the States voting
against the Declaration were concerned that the inclusion of a
right of self-determination implied a right to secession.99 A right
to secession does not exist in international law or in the
Treaty.'00 Indeed, New Zealand participants in the drafting of
the Declaration understood self-determination to signify the
right to self-determination of indigenous peoples' internal af-
fairs.'t l States were concerned with the lack of definition of "in-
Article 26 implied existence of class of citizens with veto power over land issues); U.N.
Press Release, supra note 1.
98. See generally Statement of Banks, supra note 7; U.N. Press Release, supra note 1;
cf supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing concern for private parties as an
impetus behind the F.S.A.).
99. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note I (noting that inclusion of right to
self determination was contentious, and that most governments recognize right to au-
tonomy and self-governance of indigenous groups); see also Gilbert, supra note 17, at
219 (noting that Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. objected to inclusion of
self-determination in the Declaration, concerned that it included a right to secession);
William Van Genugten & Camilo Perez-Bustilo, The Emerging International Architecture of
Indigenous Rights: The Interaction between Global, Regional, and National Dimensions, 1
INT'L J. ON MINOR-rY AND GROUP RTs. 379, 384 (2004) (discussing existence during
drafting negotiations of fear that the right to self-determination conflicts with State
territorial integrity); New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Manatu
Aorere, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Chronology of Events since
June 2006, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Human-
Rights/Indigenous-Peoples/draftdecjunO7.php (noting New Zealand's concern over is-
sues of self-determination, consent, redress and land were not addressed, and so New
Zealand refused to vote for the Declaration).
100. See Russell A. Miller, Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-
Determination, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 341, 349, 371 (2006); Federico Lenzerini, Sover-
eignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 155, 165-66 (2006) (stating that self-determination as applied to indigenous
peoples generally means internal self-determination); Graham, supra note 4, at 8 (dis-
cussing other international instruments, including the Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions among States, establishing that exercise of self-determination cannot undermine
territorial sovereignty); see also Pruner, supra note 5, at 287-88 (discussing similarities of
the Declaration and the Treaty).
101. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 219-20 (noting that the Declaration is limited in
scope by the U.N. Charter, and thus self-determination for indigenous peoples is the
same as that available to all peoples); Van Genugten & Perez-Bustilo, supra note 99, at
384 (noting that most States, including Canada, accept notion of self-determination as
used in the Declaration to apply to internal affairs of indigenous groups, with external
self-determination reserved for extraordinary circumstances); Quentin-Baxter, supra
note 89, at 28 (stating that goal of the Declaration was never secession, but rather in-
creasing rights of indigenous populations to traditional practices while remaining
within society); Taiaroa, supra note 87, at 58 (noting that author's iwi believes self-
determination means the right to make decisions in matters that affect only them); see
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digenous"' 1 2 and the focus on communal rights rather than indi-
vidual rights. 10 3 The Declaration states that self-determination is
the right of indigenous peoples to "freely determine their politi-
cal status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, '"104 and does not mention any broader right to
self-determination that may imply secession." 5
While the Declaration sets forth many specific rights, its pri-
mary goal is to strengthen the relationship between indigenous
populations and the States in which they live by affirming the
equality of citizenship of indigenous peoples.0 6 Although the
vote against the Declaration seems to reflect a general concern
that Maori receive special treatment from the government,'0 7
New Zealand emphasized that it voted against the Declaration
because it was impossible to implement.'0° New Zealand viewed
also Anaya, supra note 9, at 109 (noting that secession would likely leave indigenous
peoples worse off).
102. See Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 9, 33 (allowing indigenous groups and indi-
viduals to self-identify as such); see also Gilbert, supra note 17, at 216-17 (noting that lack
of definition a point of contention during drafting, but Articles 9 and 33 affirm self-
identification must comport with community's view of group membership).
103. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1 (guaranteeing enjoyment of rights stated
in Declaration to individuals and communities); see also Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1
(stating that rights in the Declaration are directed towards indigenous peoples as
groups).
104. Declaration, supra note 1, art 3.
105. See Van Genugten & Perez-Bustilo, supra note 99, at 384; Lenzerini, supra
note 100, at 187 (describing self-determination included in the then-draft Declaration
as internal self-government); Solomon, supra note 30, at 62 (noting that fear of seces-
sion by indigenous peoples if the Declaration includes a right to self-determination
does not reflect political reality).
106. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 220 (stating that goal of the Declaration is
greater inclusion in, rather than exclusion from, State); Daes, supra note 87, at 498
(noting that the Declaration is the first international document to affirm the equality of
indigenous peoples with other citizens); Miller, supra note 100, at 366-73 (arguing that
the Declaration contributes to establishment of discursive democracy in States with in-
digenous populations); Quentin-Baxter, supra note 89, at 29-30 (noting that the Decla-
ration will not create separate classes of citizens, but rather enhances enjoyment of
indigenous populations of civil and political rights by requiring participation in deci-
sion-making, and citing U.S. practice of granting American Indians distinct political
rights).
107. See Stavenhagen, supra note 51, 54 (noting, in discussion of the F.S.A., Ma-
ori have been historically discriminated against); Sharp, supra note 36, at 10 (noting
socio-economic disadvantages of Maori).
108. See generally Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (describing view of many coun-
tries of the Declaration as an aspirational statement and New Zealand's position that
the important topic required a document capable of being implemented in country's
positive law); see also Graham, supra note 4, at 5-7 (discussing concerns of New Zealand
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the Declaration as undermining, rather than strengthening, the
partnership between the State and the indigenous population. 0 9
New Zealanders involved in the drafting of the Declaration
knew that any international instrument to which New Zealand
became a party would require consistency with domestic law." 0
As a result, they worked to ensure the compatibility of the Decla-
ration with existing New Zealand law."' The Declaration re-
ceived widespread support from indigenous peoples worldwide
because of its goal of achieving equality for indigenous peoples
and improving relations with national governments. 1 2 In addi-
tion, the Declaration is well regarded in the Maori commu-
nity."' Scholars argue the adoption of the Declaration would
have given New Zealand an additional tool for the interpretation
government that the Declaration, then in draft phase, was incompatible with existing
New Zealand law).
109. See generally Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (asserting importance of Crown-
Maori partnership in resolving historical wrongs and inability of the Declaration to con-
tribute to that partnership); Press Release, The Maori Party, Questions-Rights of In-
digenous Peoples, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0709/S0221.htm (Sept. 13,
2007) (recording remarks of Minister of Customs Nanaia Mahuta, on behalf of the
Minister of Maori Affairs, stating that New Zealand government is committed to Maori
equality regardless of the vote on the Declaration); Elisa Burchett, A Perfect Opportunity
for CANZUS States, U.N. Observer and International Report (Dec. 22, 2006), http://
www.unobserver.com/printen.php?id=2988 (stating that the Declaration is opportunity
for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. to dissociate themselves from colo-
nial-era practices and attitudes towards indigenous populations).
110. See Graham, supra note 4, at 5-6 (noting that any rights the Declaration
granted Maori must be consistent with New Zealand domestic law, including the
Treaty); Solomon, supra note 30, at 62.
111. See Graham, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing feasibility of this goal because the
Declaration was designed to be consistent with all existing human rights instruments,
and contemporary New Zealand laws were compatible with same); see also Solomon,
supra note 30, at 61 (arguing that the right to self-determination in the Draft Declara-
tion is analogous to rights granted to Maori under Article II of the Treaty). But see Press
Release, Maori Legal Service, U.N. Working Group on the Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Nov. 22, 2000, http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/indwork.htm
(noting that the position that the Declaration must be consistent with domestic law
would limit potency of the Declaration).
112. See Taiaroa, supra note 87, at 54-55 (noting commitment of indigenous
groups to creating an international document that will improve their situation); Solo-
mon, supra note 30, at 62.
113. See generally Ward, supra note 7 (noting Maori leaders' anger at negative vote);
Initiative on the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.
converge.org.nz/pma/in210806.htm (information on New Zealand's official position
on the Declaration and letter for interested parties to send to members of Parliament
encouraging them to support the Declaration).
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and implementation of the Treaty, t14 as many of the rights
therein are analogous to those in the Declaration.' 1
5
II. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND NEW ZEALAND
The Declaration is the most recent addition to the corpus of
law available to further the rights of indigenous peoples world-
wide. Human rights treaties and customary international law
provide protection for indigenous rights." 6 This Part explores
the content of the international human rights law on indigenous
rights, discusses the legal status of the Declaration, in New Zea-
land and globally, and examines the use of international law in
New Zealand.
A. Indigenous Land Rights in International Law
International instruments protecting indigenous peoples'
rights are relatively new to the international legal forum.' 17 The
only binding international instruments are two International La-
114. See Melissa A. Poole, International Instruments in Administrative Decisions: Main-
streaming International Law, (1999) VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 29, § VI.C (analogizing
fiduciary-type relationship created by the Treaty to that created by ratified international
human rights treaties); Pruner, supra note 5, at 288 (stating that then-Draft Declaration
could assist Crown and Maori in reaching a friendly solution to customary Maori title
claims to the foreshore and seabed of New Zealand).
115. See Charters, supra note 6, § VI (stating that Maori land rights could be better
addressed by New Zealand's alignment of domestic law with international law); Quen-
tin-Baxter, supra note 89, at 33-35, 42-43, 44 (stating that the Declaration could help
New Zealand in interpretation and implementation of the Treaty, noting that Maori
already have the right to make autonomous decisions in areas that do not affect non-
Maoris, that the government seeks Maori consent and participation through Treaty ne-
gotiations and statutory duties, and noting that the Declaration will assist in empower-
ing Maori population so that Article 3 of the Treaty can be fully realized).
116. See Anaya, supra note 34, at 16-17 (discussing indigenous rights under princi-
ples of non-discrimination and cultural integrity embodied in many human rights in-
struments, including the U.N. Charter); see generally Manus, supra note 12 (discussing
international law on indigenous rights).
117. See Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the Develop-
ment of Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 291, 308-10 (2006) (discussing recent
emergence and acceptance of indigenous peoples rights as such in international law
and listing international instruments that protect indigenous rights); S. James Anaya,
Divergent Discourses about International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights over Lands and
Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 CoLo. J. INT'L E,'xVrL. L. & POL'Y 237, 242-
43 (2005) (declaring then-Draft Declaration and proposed American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples "future normative texts" of indigenous rights law); see
also Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 181-822 (discussing emerging customary international
law on indigenous rights).
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bour Organisation ("ILO") conventions. 118 The more recent of
those, ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention Number
169 ("ILO No. 169"), explicitly recognizes indigenous land
rights and directs governments to respect the special relation-
ship between indigenous peoples and their traditional lands.119
ILO No. 169, however, is generally not considered to be a strong
statement of international law because of the meager number of
signatories. 2 ° Notably, New Zealand is not a party to ILO No.
169.121
Although indigenous rights are not widely addressed by in-
ternational law, international human rights treaties and declara-
tions have widespread international support.122 Scholars frame
indigenous rights issues within the broader human rights frame-
work, as well as a developing indigenous rights body of law.123
Specifically, scholars have located a right protecting land held by
118. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 209 (noting that International Labour Organiza-
tion ("ILO") Conventions Nos. 107 and 169 are the only binding international instru-
ments on indigenous rights); see also Chidi Oguamanam, Indigenous Peoples and Interna-
tional Law: The Making of a Regime, 30 QUEEN'S L.J. 348, 364 (2004) (noting ILO Con-
vention No. 169 attempts to preserve indigenous culture, a change from ILO
Convention No. 107 of 1957, which encouraged assimilation of indigenous peoples);
Anaya, supra note 117, at 242 (reporting that an American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples is being developed).
119. International Labour Organisation, Convention Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, ILO Official Bull. 59 (entered
into force Sept. 5, 1991) (Convention No. 169) (discussing indigenous land rights in
Part II, directing government recognition and respect of indigenous land rights in Arti-
cle 13); see also Anaya, supra note 9, at 155 (discussing requirements in ILO No. 169 of
consultation and participation of indigenous peoples based on principles of self-govern-
ment and self-determination).
120. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 209 (noting that assimilationist policies of ILO
No. 157 have subjected it to much criticism, and that ILO No. 169 had been ratified by
only 17 countries); see also Anaya, supra note 34, at 40-41 (stating that, despite its sparse
ratification, most States seem to accept the general principle of protecting indigenous
land rights as shown in reports to international bodies).
121. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 209; Charters, supra note 6, § III.B.1 (noting that
New Zealand has not ratified ILO No. 169).
122. See Charters, supra note 6, § III.B.2(a) (noting that, as of 2004, 152 States
were parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and
169 States were parties to the Convention of Racial Discrimination); Off. of the U.N.
High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Status of the Ratification of International Human Rights Trea-
ties (July 14, 2006), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/stats.pdf.
123. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 211 (arguing that advocating and protecting
rights of indigenous peoples can be accomplished by using both general human rights
norms and developing indigenous rights legal framework); Anaya, supra note 117, at
241-42 (discussing two methods of locating indigenous rights in international law: as
rights belonging to independent political communities, or human rights whose recog-
320 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:298
indigenous peoples within the general human rights frame-
work.1 24 The right to property is a human right, and this precept
supports a broader right to land. 125 Indigenous land rights are
also protected as part of the rights to culture and non-discrimi-
nation found in the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights ("ICCPR") and the Convention on the Elimination of
all forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD"). 1 26 For example,
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has located the in-
digenous right to property, communally held and without for-
mal title, in both international human rights norms and the
evolving indigenous rights framework. 127  The Special Rap-
porteur on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Indigenous Peoples found a developed legal principle that indig-
enous peoples have the right to use, own, control and occupy
nition is morally compelled, and noting that the international community is more hos-
pitable to indigenous claims in a human rights framework).
124. See, e.g., Charters, supra note 6, § III.B.2(b) (identifying protection of right to
land by rights of culture, non-discrimination and property); Pruner, supra note 5, at
256-57 (discussing concept of indigenous title located within broader range of indige-
nous rights).
125. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, Art. 17 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("UDHR")
("(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with other.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."); Anaya, supra note 34, at 36-
52 (discussing land rights found in existing international instruments such as the
UDHR and Inter-American and European conventions); Charters, supra note 6,
§ III.B.2(b); see also Maia S. Campbell & S. James Anaya, The Case of the Maya Villages of
Belize: Reversing the Trend of Government Neglect to Secure Indigenous Land Rights, 8 HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 377, 398 (2008) (discussing the Belize Supreme Court's discussion of pro-
tection of indigenous land rights by customary international law and general principles
of international law).
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; see also
Lovelace v. Canada, Human Rights Committee (1981), 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1
(finding that ICCPR Article 27 includes a right to occupy traditional lands when culture
cannot be enjoyed in another place); Pruner, supra note 5, at 258, 270-71 (finding
support for indigenous title in Article 17 of the UDHR, protecting property rights; Arti-
cles 1 of the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("ICESCR"), guaranteeing self-determination; Article 27 of the ICCPR, the right
of minorities to enjoy their own culture; ILO No. 169, requiring respect of traditional
land values by the government; CERD General Recommendation 23, calling on parties
to the CERD to recognize traditional land rights).
127. See Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-
Am. Court H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79 (Judgment on merits and reparations of August 31,
2001), 11 43-44 [hereinafter Awas Tingni]; see also Gilbert, supra note 17, at 210-11
(discussing the Awas Tingni conclusion based on both international human rights
norms and an emerging legal framework of indigenous rights).
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their traditional lands, but that doing so may not necessitate full
ownership. 12' By protecting indigenous rights through more
widely recognized norms, the indigenous rights in question,
such as a general right to land, have acquired legal status indi-
rectly. 129
Although indigenous rights have been achieved more
through a human rights framework than a body of law specific to
indigenous rights, such rights are often considered to be sui
geneis." ' The Supreme Court of Belize has identified indige-
nous rights as sui generis because they are rooted in the customs
and traditions of the people concerned, rather than an estab-
lished corpus of law.' The Declaration is the most recent de-
velopment in the field, and joins the ILO Conventions as found-
ing documents of the body of international law addressing indig-
enous rights. 132
1. Customary International Law and Indigenous Rights
In addition to the nascent international law on indigenous
rights and existing human rights jurisprudence, indigenous
128. Daes, supra note 27, 39, 41.
129. See Charters, supra note 6, § III.B.2(a) (stating that indirect affirmation of
indigenous peoples rights is stronger than direct protection provided in ILO No. 169
due to large number of signatories to international human rights treaties, and noting
that rights found in customary international law, such as this indirect affirmation of
indigenous peoples land rights, are binding as New Zealand law); see alsoJ&mie Gil-
bert, Historical Indigenous Peoples' Land Claims: A Comparative and International Approach
to the Common Law Doctrine on Indigenous Title, 56 I'L & COMp. L.Q. 583, 587 (2007)
(discussing indigenous peoples' land rights supported by human rights); Wiessner,
supra note 11, at 127 (finding human rights supports indigenous peoples right to land,
though not necessarily ownership); Daes, supra note 27, 1 39 (stating that international
law and human rights norms support "a developed legal principle that indigenous peo-
ples have a collective right to the lands they traditionally use and occupy.").
130. See Gilbert, supra note 17, at 210; Anaya, supra note 34, at 38 (describing sui
generis field of indigenous rights as product of rights to cultural integrity, non-discrimi-
nation, self-determination and property).
131. See Cal v. Attorney General, Claim Nos. 171 & 172 of 2007, 101 (Supreme
Court of Belize).
132. See Anaya, supra note 117, at 242-43 (noting that the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights has proposed an American Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, and referring to proposed American Declaration and the Declaration as
"future normative texts"); Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 187-88; cf. Anaya & Wiessner,
supra note I (stating that the Declaration surpasses ILO No. 169 in guaranteeing rights
of self-determination, land, resources, and political autonomy to indigenous peoples).
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rights are protected by customary international law.'33 Custom-
ary international law is not static, but evolves to reflect contem-
porary practices and concerns.134 The traditional method of es-
tablishing a norm as customary international law requires wide-
spread state practice and opinio juris, a sense of legal obligation
on the part of the States to act according to in a particular man-
ner.13  The requisite state practice need not be unanimous or
universal, 36 and the State against which the rule is being in-
voked need not adhere to the practice.' 37
Changes in modern international law making, with much
greater reliance on international instruments, are modifying the
establishment of customary international law norms. 3 s Opinio
juris is increasingly located in international instruments rather
133. See Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 181-83; see generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra
note 1.
134. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1),June 26, 1945, 59
Stat, 1060 (stating that courts may locate customary international law in international
conventions, international custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions and
work ofjurists); Teresa Dunworth, Hidden Anxieties: Customary International Law in New
Zealand, 2 N.Z.J. PUB. INT'L L. 67, 68, 78-80 (2005) (noting that a political process leads
to formation of customary international law, and discussing four arguments against ap-
plication of customary international law: it requires adherence to international rules
over domestic rules; it is unstable; it has a democracy deficit; and it violates separation
of power); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 529
(1993) (noting that customary international law reflects evolving international issues);
cf Palmer & Palmer, supra note 20, at 338 (discussing New Zealand court's recognition
of the Treaty's requirement of interpretation that reflects changing social and legal
circumstance).
135. See Dunworth, supra note 134, at 68; see also Charters, supra note 6,
§ III.C.2(a); Charney, supra note 134, at 536-37; Ted L. Stein, The Approach ofa Different
Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J.
457, 458 (1985).
136. See Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; Charters, supra note 6, § III.B.2(b) (dis-
cussing decision of the International Court ofJustice in Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 40 (June 27), holding that State action should be
consistent with rule and that inconsistent acts should be seen as breaches of the rule
rather than absence of a rule, and noting that near-unanimous consent is necessary
only for a jus cogens norm).
137. See Stein, supra note 135, at 458; see also Charney, supra note 134, at 536 (stat-
ing that international community, not individual States, must accept the norm); cf
Anaya, supra note 117, at 252-56 (discussing Awas Tingni concurring opinion of Judge
Garcia Ramirez, referencing ILO No. 169, though Nicaragua not party to the treaty,
and to the then-Draft Declaration and proposed American Declaration).
138. See Stein, supra note 135, at 465; Laurence R. Helfer, Nonconsensual Interna-
tional Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 71, 86-90 (2008) (discussing erosion of state
consent required for application of norms developed in human rights treaties).
2008] MAORI LAND CLAIMS IN NEW ZEALAND
than state practice. 3 Although international instruments are
not necessarily codifications of customary international law,
their formation, application and interpretation are illustrative of
the opiniojuris held by the States creating and becoming party to
the instruments. 140
Retreating from a formalist interpretation of customary in-
ternational law strengthens the protection of indigenous rights
by customary international law.' 4 1 The indigenous rights to self-
determination and cultural integrity are established in custom-
ary international law.'4 2 A narrow right of state protection of
indigenous peoples to lands traditionally owned or occupied is
recognized as a principle of customary international law.1 43 New
Zealand and other States that voted against the Declaration ob-
serve the practice of protecting the rights of indigenous peoples
139. See, e.g., Charney, supra note 134, at 543 ("Rather than state practice and
opiniojuris, multilateral forums often play a central role in the creation and shaping of
contemporary international law."); Stein, supra note 135, at 465 (noting that opiniojuris
attaches to an internationally created rule upon its creation, rather than evolving over
time); Helfer, supra note 138, at 90 (discussing the "erosion of the consent principle"
some commentators find in human rights treaties).
140. See Charters, supra note 6, § III.C.2 (stating that international instruments
may codify or crystallize customary international law, but that customary international
law cannot be found in General Assembly resolutions alone); Oguamanam, supra note
118, at 398 (arguing that opiniojuris for indigenous rights is found in international law
jurisprudence rather than individual State practice, and that obligation is moral as well
as legal); Charney, supra note 134, at 543 (stating that customary international law is
often made by and influenced in multilateral forums); Stein, supra note 135, at 465.
141. See Anaya, supra note 117, at 248-49 (stating that adoption of overly formalist
approach to the Declaration prevents flexibility and evolution that will occur and con-
tribute to normative evolution of rights, and arguing for a realist approach); Charters,
supra note 6, § III.B.2 (discussing indigenous rights from a formalist perspective, and
noting that if such rights are found in formal and positivist analysis, they are present
under realist or natural law perspective).
142. See Wiessner, supra note 11, at 127 (arguing that international instruments on
indigenous peoples rights, together with State practice of countries who have indige-
nous populations, create opinio juris to rights to cultural identity, political, economic
and social self-determination, traditional lands, and to government commitment to pro-
tecting those rights); Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 186-87; Parrish, supra note 117, at
310; Oguamanam, supra note 118, at 350; Manus, supra note 12, at 565-70.
143. See Awas Tingni, 151-55 (finding rights of indigenous peoples to traditional
lands in customary international law); Anaya & Wiessner, supra note I (discussing fac-
tors that ground right to State protection of indigenous peoples control over their
lands); Charters, supra note 6, § V.B.4 (finding that customary international law exists
to establish State duty to protect indigenous rights to land, albeit a narrow duty); Wiess-
ner, supra note 11, at 127; see also Gilbert, supra note 129, at 586-87 (discussing custom-
ary international law of indigenous tide).
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to traditional lands in various degrees.1 44 For example, since the
creation of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, New Zealand has em-
braced the recognition of indigenous peoples' rights to land, 145
and Article II of the Treaty is similar to a guarantee of Maori self-
determination. 1
46
2. The Declaration as Customary International Law
The Declaration does not, in itself, have a legally binding
effect. 14 7 The importance of the Declaration should not be un-
derstated: since international declarations can serve as the start-
ing point for the development of a greater corpus of law.148 The
Declaration is arguably a codification of the developing body of
international indigenous rights law.149 Regardless of its legal sta-
tus, the Declaration has persuasive moral and political force as
the first international statement on the rights of indigenous peo-
144. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; see also Wiessner, supra note 11, at
109-10 (stating that no government, during drafting of the Declaration, opposed princi-
ple that indigenous peoples have rights relating to their lands).
145. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note I (noting that four States who voted
against the Declaration all recognize indigenous land rights in domestic practice); see
also Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (stating that Maori have a right to redress for
historical land claims and participate in democratic decision-making processes).
146. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; see also Marguerite L. Spencer, A
White American Female Civil Rights Attorney in New Zealand: What Maori Experience(s) Teach
Me About the Cause, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 255, 277 (2001) (discussing similarities of
rangatiratanga, as used in Article II of the Treaty, to the partnership concept implicit in
a relational approach to indigenous rights).
147. See generally U.N. Press Release, supra note I (noting that the Declaration is
non-binding); see also Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (stating New Zealand's position
that the Declaration is an aspirational statement rather than clear guidelines, and as
such the Declaration will go unimplemented in the majority of countries, an unaccept-
able fate for a document of such importance).
148. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (comparing the Declaration to
the UDHR, articles of which reflect and embody customary international law); see also
Gilbert, supra note 17, at 229-30 (noting that the UDHR was a framework for develop-
ment of an international human rights regime, and that the Declaration affirms emer-
gence of indigenous peoples as actors in the international human rights system); Brent
D. Hessel, United Nations Update, 15 No. 1 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 53, 53 (2007) (noting that
indigenous rights activists believe the international community will adopt an indige-
nous rights convention within years).
149. See Van Genugten & Perez-Bustilo, supra note 99, at 407 (arguing that an
indigenous rights declaration with broad support has more value than one with specific
guidelines); Oguamanam, supra note 118, at 368, 398-99 (considering the then-Draft
Declaration proof of growing international agreement and attempt to codify indige-
nous rights); Quentin-Baxter, supra note 89, at 23 (arguing that then-Draft Declaration
codified and developed international law on indigenous rights).
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ples to enjoy such widespread support.1 50 The Declaration may
be considered a set of guidelines for countries when addressing
claims by indigenous peoples. 15 1 Indeed, the Declaration states
that the rights it guarantees are the "minimum standards" neces-
sary for indigenous peoples worldwide.1 52 Moreover, two States
have already acted to implement the Declaration into domestic
law. 15
3
Although four States voted against the Declaration, and
have issued statements that the Declaration is not evidence of
customary international law, the argument that all or part of the
Declaration has the character of customary international law is
not foreclosed.154 The States who voted against the Declaration
150. See Brookfield, supra note 8, at 77 (stating that the Declaration will have
moral rather than legal force, and will help legitimize indigenous peoples claims
against national governments); see also Graham, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that New
Zealand's government recognizes then-Draft Declaration would have moral rather than
legal force).
151. See Matthew S R Palmer, The International Practice, in RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 87, 87 (Alison Quentin-Baxter ed. 1998) (stating that then-
Draft Declaration consists of broad principles to assist governments in relationships
with indigenous populations); New Zealand Human Rights Comm'n, About the
Human Rights Commission, http://www.hrc.co.nz/home/hrc/newsandissues/indige-
nousrightsdeclarationtoguidecommissionwork.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2008) (noting
that the Declaration is not legally binding but a statement of standards governments
should strive for in relations with indigenous peoples); see also Statement of Tauli-
Corpuz, supra note 87 (calling the Declaration a minimum standard to which laws must
conform); cf Charters, supra note 6, § III.B.1 (stating that, although New Zealand is not
a signatory to ILO No. 169, it may still be regarded as a benchmark for the Crown's
relations with Maori, and, indeed, claimants before CERD on the F.S.A. argued that the
Committee should not allow its jurisprudence to fall below the standards set in ILO No.
169).
152. See Declaration, supra note 1, art. 43 ("The rights recognized herein consti-
tute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous
peoples of the world."); see also CERD, Concluding Observations, Report of United
States of America, 72nd session, Feb., 2008, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6, 29 (rec-
ommending use of the Declaration as a guideline for interpretation of obligations to
indigenous peoples in the U.S.).
153. See generally U.N. News Centre, supra note 3 (noting that Bolivia and Ecuador
have enacted legislation to give the Declaration domestic force); Rodolfo Stavenhagen,
Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of Indigenous People, Addendum, Preliminary note on the mission to Bolivia (Dec. 11,
2007), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/15/Add.2, 1 5 (noting Bolivian government was taking
steps to incorporate the Declaration into domestic law).
154. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (discussing possibility of locating
customary international law in general principles and specific articles of the Declara-
tion and probable legal recognition of provisions of the Declaration recognizing rights
to culture, language, religion and identity); see Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 175 (refer-
ring to the then-draft Declaration as evidence of state practice regarding indigenous
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in the U.N. General Assembly have well-established state prac-
tices recognizing the land rights of indigenous peoples. 55 In
New Zealand, this practice is found in the Treaty and subsequent
government actions recognizing and respecting Maori land
rights."5 6 New Zealand, as well as Australia, Canada, and the
U.S., recognize the rights and special status of indigenous peo-
ples within their domestic law, thus making them part of an in-
ternational consensus recognizing indigenous rights as custom-
ary international law. 57
Courts and scholars cite the large number of votes in favor
of the Declaration in support of the conclusion that it represents
evolving principles of international law. 58 Furthermore, the fact
that the four States contributed to the formation of the Declara-
tion for many years before deciding to vote against it points to a
sense of opiniojuris: if the final draft had reflected their desired
rights); see also Statement of Tauli-Corpuz, supra note 87 (stating that preambular refer-
ence to the U.N. Charter affirms that the Declaration and the rights stated therein are
based on international legal principles). But see U.N. Press Release, supra note 1 (noting
position of Australian government that the Declaration was not evidence of State prac-
tice or opiniojuris).
155. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (noting that surveys they previ-
ously, and individually, conducted found State practice conformed to most rights in the
Declaration); see also Oguamanam, supra note 118, at 373-80 (discussing practices of the
four States voting against the Declaration recognizing and protecting indigenous
rights).
156. See Oguamanam, supra note 118, at 379-80 (identifying creation of Tribunal
to protect Treaty rights); Quentin-Baxter, supra note 89, at 32 (stating that main con-
cepts in the Declaration are also found in the Treaty, and that Maori already have au-
tonomy in areas that do not affect non-Maoris and give consent to government propos-
als affecting Maori interests).
157. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (stating that four States voting
against the Declaration all recognize indigenous rights to land); Oguamanam, supra
note 118, at 373-80; Wiessner, supra note 11, at 109-10 (stating that States did not object
to the principles included in then-draft Declaration, including principle that indige-
nous peoples have rights to their traditional lands, signifying an international consen-
sus on indigenous land rights).
158. See Cal v. Attorney General, Claim Nos. 171 & 172 of 2007, 131 (Supreme
Court of Belize) (referring to "overwhelming number" of States adopting the Declara-
tion as indicative of the Declaration's embodiment of emerging international principles
on indigenous peoples and land rights); Campbell & Anaya, supra note 125, at 398
(discussing the Belize Court's use of the Declaration as a reflection of general princi-
ples of international law); see generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (discussing al-
most unanimous vote adopting the Declaration). But cf Julie Mertus, The New U.S.
Human Rights Policy: A Radical Departure, 4 I-rr'L STUD. PERSP. 371, 371 (2003) (assum-
ing that the U.S. is powerful enough to have the sole influence on the creation and
application of international human rights law, despite the positions and practices of
other countries).
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changes and preferences, the States, including New Zealand,
would likely have voted for the Declaration. 5 9 New Zealand's
government, upon the adoption of the Draft Declaration in
1996, believed that New Zealand's participation in the drafting
of the Declaration signified its belief in the importance of the
subject and projected that the Declaration would influence do-
mestic government behavior. 6 ° Scholars argue these acts signify
a general sense of legal obligation on the part of the New Zea-
land government to protect the rights of indigenous peoples set
forth in the Declaration.' 6 '
The Declaration already has been applied by a country's
highest court to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. The
Supreme Court of Belize used the Declaration as a statement of
international law in October 2007, only one month after its
adoption, in holding that the government must recognize
Mayans customary rights to land. 6 2 Although noting that the
Declaration is not a binding legal document, the Belize Supreme
Court described it as containing principles of international law
as relating to indigenous peoples and their land. 163
At a minimum, the Declaration signifies a broad customary
international law norm that indigenous peoples do have land
rights.' 64 Although New Zealand objected to specific state duties
159. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (stating that States who voted
against the Declaration would have voted in favor, and demonstrated their willingness
to be legally bound, had their own policy and political preferences been reflected in the
final document); U.N. Press Release, supra note 1 (reporting statement of Banks em-
phasizing importance of indigenous rights to New Zealand, and commitment of New
Zealand to remedying historical wrongs to Maoris).
160. See Graham, supra note 4, at 15 (stating that the Declaration would have great
moral and persuasive power on government actions); see generally Statement of Banks,
supra note 7 (stating that New Zealand government wanted a document that could be
incorporated into domestic law, but voted against the Declaration when it was perceived
to be unimplementable).
161. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; see also Graham, supra note 4, at
15.
162. See Cal v. Attorney General, 1 131 (citing to art. 26(1) of the Declaration in
holding the government of Belize must demarcate and otherwise recognize indigenous
title of Mayan plaintiffs to land customary held and used); Campbell & Anaya, supra
note 125, at 398 (noting the Belize Court was the first to use the Declaration in decid-
ing a case); see generally Kim Peterson, Indigenous Rights and the Mayan Victor) in Belize,
UPSIDE DowN WORLD, Feb. 1, 2008, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/
1113/68/ (noting that the Belize Court was the first to refer to the Declaration, and
that, as a result, the case will likely become international legal precedent).
163. See Cal v. Attorney General, 9 131.
164. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note I (stating that lack of unanimous
2008]
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included in the Declaration, such objections do not undermine
the emergence of an international norm, recognizing at a mini-
mum, a duty to respect indigenous peoples' relationships with
the land.a65 Scholars consider the Declaration to be a broad
statement of customary international law on indigenous land
rights rather than specific customary international law on how
States must treat those rights.'66
3. The Persistent Objector Theory and the Declaration
The persistent objector theory in international law allows a
State to avoid compliance with a customary international law
norm if the State has consistently objected to the rule during its
formation.167 Historically, this has been difficult to establish.16
As customary international law is established increasingly
through or codified in multilateral instruments.169 As a result,
the aspiring persistent objector can oppose the instrument, or a
part thereof, to declare its position against the emerging rule. 1
70
international support for rights is a limitation on the right, not a denial of the right); see
also Charters, supra note 6, § III.C.2(a) (stating that negotiation process for the Declara-
tion shows indigenous land rights are generally accepted, and noting that most State
objection to then-Draft Declaration was to the right of self-determination).
165. See id. (noting New Zealand's objection to a duty to protect indigenous lands
and provide restitution for taking of such); Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; see also
Helfer, supra note 138, at 124-25 (concluding that States are increasingly bound by
rules they did not affirmatively accept).
166. See Cal. v. Attorney General, Claim Nos. 171 & 172 of 2007, 1 132 (Supreme
Court of Belize) (referring to the Declaration as "embodying ... general principles of
international law relating to indigenous peoples and their land and resources"); Anaya
& Wiessner, supra note 1; Charters, supra note 6, sec. V (noting unlikelihood of courts
finding a broad customary international law right to indigenous peoples' land, but that
a narrow right could be found in the Declaration to provide protection of Treaty
rights).
167. See Stein, supra note 135, at 457. But see Charney, supra note 134, at 539-40
(discussing lack of State practice regarding persistent objector principle, making its
existence as rule questionable).
168. See Stein, supra note 135, at 466-67 (noting that customary international law
historically emerged from practice of a few States, making objection difficult); Charney,
supra note 134, at 538-39.
169. See Anaya, supra note 117, at 240-43 (discussing development of customary
international law norms in the absence of express state acceptance of legal principles);
Heifer, supra note 138, at 86-90 (discussing emergence of customary international law
though multilateral forums).
170. See Stein, supra note 135, at 466 (noting that the voting process for General
Assembly resolutions allows States to voice their objections on record); see also Anaya &
Wiessner, supra note I (discussing possibility of States who voted against the Declara-
tion being persistent objectors only to provisions identified in vote).
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New Zealand, as well as the other States voting against the Decla-
ration, stated that the Declaration does not embody customary
international law, rooting its vote against the Declaration in an
objection to any legal status the Declaration may have or gain.171
The vote against the Declaration allowed New Zealand to easily
state its objections to being bound by any emerging norms in
indigenous rights.'72 This modern use of the persistent objector
theory allows States to avoid the rules created through a multilat-
eral process. 173 Because New Zealand specified the articles that
caused it to vote against the Declaration, New Zealand may ar-
gue that it has persistent objector status to those articles.'74
New Zealand's status as persistent objector to the document
as a whole, however, is doubtful.'75 As States become subject to
an increasing number of international obligations they did not
affirmatively accept, the persistent objector rule has become a
weaker tool for avoiding international obligations. 176 New Zea-
171. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; U.N. Press Release, supra note 1
(discussing objections of States voting against the Declaration due to its legal status); see
also Statement of Banks, supra note 7 (explaining that negotiation history and manner
the Declaration was adopted prevent it from reflecting State practice or general princi-
ples of law, especially the articles to which New Zealand specifically objected); cf Cal v.
Attorney General 131 (noting that reliance the Declaration was strengthened by Belize's
vote in favor); Anaya & Wiessner, supra note I (stating that Canada's position as persis-
tent objector is tenuous because of its strong support of the Declaration before the
change in government).
172. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; see also Stein, supra note 135, at
467 (noting that ability to object by vote was not possible for persistent objectors during
the principle's emergence).
173. See Stein, supra note 135, at 468 (stating that the persistent objector principle
gives the United States and other States a way to avoid being bound by rules developed
through multilateral channels with which they disagree); Charney, supra note 134, at
544-45 (discussing importance of analyzing reasons for objection, and noting that States
objecting at a multilateral forum to a new rule may be isolated in their viewpoint, or
they may be important enough to prevent the emergence of a new norm).
174. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (stating that States voting against
the Declaration could be, at most, persistent objectors to specific articles they found
objectionable); see also Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 187-88 (noting that States may in-
voke sovereignty as reason for non-acceptance of emerging customary international law
norns).
175. See generally Anaya & 'WAiessner, supra note 1 (stating that Canada's status as
persistent objector is doubtful); see also Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 187-88 (discussing
minimum requirements established in customary international law for indigenous sov-
ereignty that cannot be breached even by purported objector).
176. See Anne Peters, Global Constitutionalism Revisited, 11 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 39,
51 (2005) (stating that changes in international law making have caused the persistent
objector doctrine to weaken); Helfer, supra note 138, at 74 (noting multilateral treaty
creation no longer requires consensus); see also Stein, supra note 135, at 477 (arguing
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land's appears to accept the opinio juris behind the majority of
the Declaration 7' and has a domestic practice that belies its po-
sition that the Declaration is incompatible with domestic law.
178
This limits New Zealand's ability to raise the persistent objector
defense to general statements of indigenous rights as well as the
portions of the Declaration to which it did not specifically ob-
ject. 1 ' As a result, scholars assert that an attempt by New Zea-
land to raise a persistent objector defense to argue against any
customary international law norms stated in the Declaration is
on shaky ground.'80
B. New Zealand's Domestic Application of International
Human Rights Laws
International law, including international human rights law,
is a part of New Zealand law.'18 New Zealand's Parliament must
take the country's international obligations into consideration
before new legislation can be enacted,8 2 and its courts must
that the persistent objector principle should only be permitted to protect those rights
already enjoyed by a State, and not to rights that were unaddressed by international law,
such as the rights stated in the Declaration, prior to the objectionable statement).
177. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1 (noting that New Zealand was in
support of the majority of the Declaration, and the Declaration's purpose of protecting
indigenous rights); U.N. Press Release, supra note 1 (noting the importance of indige-
nous rights to New Zealand).
178. See generally Denise Henare, A Case Study: Health Care, in RECOGNISING THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 104 (Alison Quentin-Baxter, ed. 1998) (comparing the
Maori Co-Purchasing Organizations, a health care initiative, with the then-Draft Decla-
ration to show that the New Zealand government is willing and able to allow for Maori
autonomy within the nation-State); Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, A New Zealand Case
Study: Child Welfare, in RECOGNISING THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 132 (Alison
Quentin-Baxter ed. 1998) (discussing New Zealand child welfare policies and stating
that, should New Zealand adopt the Declaration, little change would be needed in that
area).
179. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note 1; see also Lenzerini, supra note 100,
at 187-88; Charney, supra note 134, at 544-45.
180. See generally Anaya & Wiessner, supra note I ("The internal practice of the
four opposing states, as well as their consent to accord a special status and rights to
indigenous peoples in principle, makes them part of the world consensus on customary
international law . . . ."); Charters, supra note 6, § VI (stating that New Zealand has
breached international law in its domestic policy).
181. See Law Comm'n, Te Aka Matua 0 Te Ture, A New Zealand Guide to Interna-
tional Law and its Sources, Report 34 (1996) 65 (describing five ways for New Zealand
courts to consider signed treaties, including as statement of customary international law
which is part of domestic law); Core Document, supra note 4, 1 53 (stating that New
Zealand government must consider its international obligations as New Zealand law).
182. See Charters, supra note 6, § V.A (discussing requirement of cabinet members
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construe domestic law to be consistent with international law,
obligations and standards, including international human rights
law.'" 3 As a result, domestic law may serve as a conduit through
which the courts can import international standards on human
rights.1
8 4
1. International Human Rights and Domestic Legislation
Legislation must be consistent with New Zealand's interna-
tional law obligations.' 85 Customary international law is auto-
matically binding in New Zealand,8 6 but treaty law is binding
only when incorporated into domestic law.'8 7 Since New Zea-
land operates under a dualist system of treaty incorporation, leg-
islation must be passed before any international agreement will
have domestic effect.' 8 In determining whether to become a
to vet all bills to ensure compliance with international obligations); Core Document,
supra note 4, 117 (noting that failure of Parliament to consider relevant international
law, where the statute permits, will lead to review).
183. See Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v. Sutton, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R.
426, 430 (CA) (describing interpretative rule used by New Zealand courts that con-
strues domestic statutes to be consistent with international law); Sellers v. Maritime
Safety Inspector, [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 44, 57 (CA) (stating that international law obliga-
tions must be considered when construing domestic maritime law); see also Melissa A.
Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human
Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 660-61 (2007) (stating that common law coun-
tries are increasingly receptive to use of a tool of interpretation that requires courts to
interpret statutes to avoid conflict with international law).
184. See Nicholls v. Registrar of the Court of Appeal, [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. 385, 398
(using decisions of the Human Rights Committee and European Committee on
Human Rights to determine bounds of right to legal assistance stated in the BORA); see
also Joseph, supra note 16, § 26.5.3 (noting that BORA is an affirmation of New Zea-
land's obligations under and commitment to the ICCPR and, as such, allows courts to
apply international human rights jurisprudence and standards to domestic cases).
185. See Quentin-Baxter, supra note 89, at 43 (noting that compliance with interna-
tional law is required as a constitutional convention); Core Document, supra note 4,
117.
186. See Charters, supra note 6, § III.A; see alsoJoseph, supra note 16, § 1.4.4 (stat-
ing that New Zealand courts follow the ICJ approach to locating customary interna-
tional law norms).
187. See Charters, supra note 6, § V.A;Joseph, supra note 16, § 1.4.4; Law Comm'n,
supra note 181, 9 33, 43 (stating that treaties require legislative action to become
domestic law).
188. See Core Document, supra note 4, 89 (stating that any treaty to which New
Zealand is party must be enacted through legislation to have domestic effect, and do-
mestic law is reviewed before ascending to a treaty to ensure compatibility with domes-
tic law and evaluate the necessity of reservations to the treaty or implementing legisla-
tion); Law Comm'n, supra note 181, 9191 33, 43 (stating that treaties require legislative
action to become part of domestic law).
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party to a treaty or other international instrument, the govern-
ment undertakes a review of existing domestic law to determine
what changes to the law, or the treaty, are necessary to ensure
compliance of domestic law with international law.' 89
Likewise, any domestic legislation must be consistent with
international law. 9 ' An explicit legislative affirmation of New
Zealand's international human rights obligations is the Bill of
Rights Act 1990 ("BORA"). 91 The preamble of the BORA af-
firms New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR, 9 2 and the text
directs the Attorney General to ensure that all bills are consis-
tent with BORA, and thus the ICCPR.' 93 The Minister sponsor-
ing a bill must verify that it complies with New Zealand's interna-
tional law obligations, and the Attorney General must consider
international human rights jurisprudence when evaluating
whether a bill complies with BORA.' 94
2. International Human Rights in New Zealand Courts
New Zealand courts have not been hesitant to look to both
international and foreign decisions in discerning the content of
189. See Law Comm'n, supra note 181, 89; Core Document, supra note 4, 1 117;
Charters, supra note 6, § V.A; see also Law Comm'n, supra note 181, 54 (stating that
New Zealand became a party to the Convention on Torture, the Genocide Convention
and the Convention on Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons without mak-
ing changes to domestic law, as it was considered to already offer adequate protection).
190. See Charters, supra note 6, § V.B.2(a) (discussing requirement of cabinet
members to vet all bills to ensure compliance with international obligations); Core Doc-
ument, supra note 4, 117 (noting that failure of Parliament to consider relevant inter-
national law, where the statute permits, will lead to review).
191. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109; see Palmer, supra
note 34, at 566-67 (discussing BORA); Charters, supra note 6, § V.B.II(b) (discussing
duty of courts to interpret laws consistent with BORA, and therefore the ICCPR rights
incorporated therein).
192. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, pmbl. ("An Act ... [t]o affirm New
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.").
193. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 7; see also Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1
N.Z.L.R. 1, 92 (looking to law of other common law countries and the rights con-
tained in the ICCPR and Convention of the Rights Child ("CRC") to determine that a
right to privacy is protected by BORA because it is protected internationally); Joseph,
supra note 16, § 26.5.3; Palmer, supra note 34, at 566 (noting BORA is a statute equal to
all others, and must be interpreted as such); Law Comm'n, supra note 181, 59
(describing the necessity of all legislation to conform to BORA and to New Zealand's
international obligations and international standards).
194. See Charters, supra note 6, § V.B.II(b); Law Comm'n, supra note 181, 7 (not-
ing that necessity of ensuring amendments to existing legislation are consistent with
international law is especially true in the area of human rights).
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New Zealand human rights law.195 The courts apply an interpre-
tive tool that presumes consistency with international obligations
rather than requiring mandatory review.' 9 6 Although New Zea-
land's courts are under no obligation to look at international
tribunal decisions or cases from foreign jurisdictions,'97 deci-
sions of international tribunals, treaty bodies and foreign tribu-
nals are persuasive authority.' 98 Recognition of the importance
of observing a State's international obligations encourages the
courts to look to non-domestic sources of law when reaching de-
cisions.199
Specifically, because the BORA clearly affirms the domestic
importance of the rights in the ICCPR, New Zealand courts look
to decisions by the Human Rights Committee as "considerable
persuasive authority."2 °  In Tavita v. Minister of Immigration,20 1
195. See, e.g., Hosking, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 92; see generally Claudia Geiringer,
Tavita and All That: Confronting the Confusion Surrounding Unincorporated Treaties and Ad-
ministrative Law, 21 N.Z.U.L.REv. 66 (2004) (discussing cases in which the courts deci-
sions considered or relied on international law).
196. See Sellers v. Maritime Safety Inspector [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 44, 57 (CA) (con-
cluding a maritime statute was consistent with New Zealand's international obligations);
see also Geiringer, supra note 195, at 72-88 (discussing the two models and advocating
use of the former, especially in human rights cases);Jason N.E. Varuhas, Keeping Things
in Proportion: The Judiciay, Executive Action and Human Rights, 22 N.Z.U.L.REv. 300, § V
(2006) (advocating use of proportionality review of legislation that touches on human
rights).
197. See Puli'uvea v. Removal Review Authority, [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 538 (CA) (hold-
ing that failure to look at international tribunal decisions or cases from foreign jurisdic-
tions to reach holding on domestic law was not error because no general obligation
exists to do so); Joanna Harrington, The Democratic Challenge of Incorporation: Interna-
tional Human Rights Treaties and National Constitutions, 38 Vicr. U. WELLINGTON L. REv.
217, § III (2007) (noting New Zealand law does not require courts to consider non-
domestic legal decisions).
198. See Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 6 (stating that international
obligations provide guidance to interpretation of domestic rights law, and decisions of
treaty-based bodies should not be ignored when New Zealand courts are willing to draw
on case law from other jurisdictions and New Zealand is a party to the First Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, allowing individuals to make complaints to the Human Rights
Committee ("HRC")); Harrington, supra note 197, § III (noting that because BORA
affirms New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR, New Zealand courts have used HRC
decisions as persuasive authority).
199. See Hosking, I N.Z.L.R 1, 6 ("To ignore international obligations would be
to exclude a vital source of relevant guidance. It is unreal to draw upon the decisions of
Courts in other jurisdictions (as we commonly do) yet not draw upon the teachings of
international law."); Waters, supra note 183, at 662 (discussing necessity of considering
international obligations to avoid international criticism).
200. R v. Goodwin (No. 2), [1993] 2 N.Z.L.R. 390, at *11 (referring to application
by the HRC of ICCPR Art. 9(1) to determine content of its analog in BORA, and giving
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the Court of Appeal relied on decisions by the U.N. Human
Rights Committee in concluding that the Minister of Immigra-
tion had to consider New Zealand's obligations under the
ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC")
when exercising authority under the Immigration Act. 20 2 The
Court explained that the ratification by New Zealand of the First
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR indicated that the Human
Rights Committee ("HRC") became part of the New Zealand's
legal structure, 20 3 and that a failure to consider New Zealand's
international obligations, regardless of their enactment in do-
mestic law, would attract criticism.20 4  Tavita signaled to the
courts that international obligations must be considered when
construing rights of people in New Zealand.20 5 In essence, the
courts use international law to fill gaps perceived in the domestic
law protection of human rights. 2 6 The courts' concern that a
the HRC decision much weight because BORA purports to be an affirmation of New
Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR).
201. Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257 (holding that an
immigrant man who serves as the primary caregiver for his small, New Zealand-born
child should not be deported to Samoa); see also Melissa A. Waters, Using Human Rights
Treaties to Resolve Ambiguity: The Advent of a Rights-Conscious Charming Betsy Canon, 38
VIcrr. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 237, § L.A (2007) (noting that Tavita overturned Ashby v.
Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 N.Z.L.R. 222 (CA) which adhered to a strict dualist
requirement for treaty law application).
202. Tavita, 2 N.Z.L.R. at 262, 265, 266 (relying on two European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR") decisions, an English court decision, a Canadian court decision, and
the ICCPR, CRC and First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR in concluding that deporta-
tion of primary care giver would violate the rights of the child); see also Waters, supra
note 183, at 662.
203. Tavita, 2 N.Z.L.R. at 266; see also Waters, supra note 183, at 662 (discussing
Tavita's use of international law to grant greater human rights protections than allowed
in domestic law).
204. Tavita, 2 N.Z.L.R. at 266; see also Waters, supra note 201, § L.A (discussing the
Court's use of international law in reaching its holding); Geiringer, supra note 195, at
103-04 (listing international censure as one reason governments comply with interna-
tional human rights obligations).
205. See Hosking v. Runting, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 6; Charters, supra note 6, sec.
V.A (noting that Tavita implies that New Zealand must consider comments of interna-
tional treaties, even those that are unincorporated, in making administrative decisions);
Geiringer, supra note 195, at 71.
206. See, e.g., H v. Y, [2005] N.Z.L.R. 152, 1 88 (CA) (noting that international law
sources are useful for identifying New Zealand human rights law, but determining no
customary international law standards existed as to right to know identity of biological
father); Waters, supra note 183, at 662 (discussing the Tavita's court use of international
law to grant greater human rights protections than allowed in domestic law); Charters,
supra note 6, § V.A (noting that Tavita implies that New Zealand must consider the
comments of international treaty bodies in national law); Poole, supra note 114, § III.A
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breach of international legal obligations will have consequences
in the international legal and political spheres results in a will-
ingness to look to international jurisprudence. 20 7
Other decisions prioritize domestic law and interests over
international obligations. In an immigration case factually simi-
lar to Tavita, Elika v. Minister of Immigration218 found that New
Zealand's international obligations, such as the ICCPR and CRC,
must be balanced against conflicting domestic interests, and that
the Immigration Service acted lawfully in applying an internal
policy directing that state interests should be given "substantial
weight. '2 9 In Lawson v. Housing New Zealand,210 the Court deter-
mined that it was not the proper venue to resolve whether if New
Zealand's international legal obligations were fulfilled, leaving
the question to the international forum. 21t
Unlike treaty law, customary international law is automati-
cally binding on New Zealand courts.212 One area in which
courts have not hesitated to apply a customary international law
norm when domestic law is silent is in the application of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. 213 Where international standards
are less clear than in sovereign immunity, the court has engaged
(stating that the Tavita court used international instruments in a manner consistent
with legislative intent).
207. See Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257; Dunworth, supra
note 134, at 78 (discussing in.portance of courts' adherence to international law obliga-
tions to avoid international criticism and accompanying implicit recognition of New
Zealand's place in global community); Geiringer, supra note 195, at 103-04.
208. Elika v. Minister of Immigration, [1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 741 (considering rights of
a woman, set to be deported under an investigation compliant with New Zealand's Im-
migration Service's policy, who brought a claim that her removal would violate the
rights and interests of her family, including her children born in New Zealand).
209. Elika, 1 N.Z.L.R. at 747 (quoting Immigration Service's policy); see also Poole,
supra note 114, § III.B (discussing New Zealand Immigrant Service's response to Tavita
by including New Zealand's international obligations in guidelines used for considering
immigrant status).
210. Lawson v. Housing New Zealand, [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 474.
211. Lawson, 2 N.Z.L.R. at 498.
212. SeeJoseph, supra note 16, § 1.4.4 (noting that customary international law is
part of New Zealand law); Dunworth, supra note 134, at 67 (stating that, unlike treaty
law, customary law is binding on New Zealand courts without legislative action).
213. See Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v. Sutton, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R.
426, 430 (CA) (stating that customary international law, "in matters such as sovereign
immunity," applies unless there is clear legislative intent otherwise); see also Dunworth,
supra note 134, at 69-71 (discussing application of doctrine of sovereign immunity by
New Zealand courts, a doctrine not located in legislative action but only in customary
international law, so that there is no concern over conflicting intentions, and noting
the strength of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in international law).
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in analysis of whether a customary international law norm ex-
ists. 2 11 In H v. Y, the Court found that an adult had no right to
learn the identity of his biological father under customary inter-
national law.2 15 Although some support for the proposition ex-
isted in State practice, it did not have sufficient widespread sup-
port to be considered a norm.21 6 While principles of customary
international law addressing indigenous land rights are not as
ingrained in State practice as that of sovereign immunity, they
do enjoy State support to a far greater degree than that of the
right at issue in H v. y211
3. The Declaration in New Zealand
Tribunals and Commissions
Although New Zealand courts have not invoked the Declara-
tion in explaining their decisions, other adjudicatory and review
bodies in New Zealand have been quick to embrace the Declara-
tion as a tool for interpreting New Zealand's domestic legal obli-
gations. The Waitangi Tribunal, in a 1996 report on the
Taranaki settlement, relied on the then-draft Declaration in
making recommendations for the resolution of Taranaki Maori
claims to traditional lands. 21" The Tribunal discussed the inter-
play between State sovereignty and Maori authority, rooted in
the Treaty, and its increased significance due to a contempora-
neous international focus on indigenous rights, specifically iden-
tifying the then-draft Declaration. 219 In issuing its conclusions,
214. See H v. Y, [2005] N.Z.F.L.R. 152, 88 (CA); Dunworth, supra note 134, at 81-
84 (advocating a "pedigree approach" to court's customary international law adher-
ence).
215. H v. Y, [2005] N.Z.F.L.R. 152, at 88 (concluding, after reviewing the CRC,
statements by the Committee of the CRC and European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") decisions, that "international instruments, practice and jurisprudence have
not yet reached the point where it can conclusively be said that adopted children pos-
sess a universal and internationally recognized right to know their biological parentage,
although the tide of opinion is flowing in that direction").
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Lenzerini, supra note 100, at 163-64 (discussing indigenous peoples'
right to sovereignty in customary international law); Wiessner, supra note 11, at 127
(discussing indigenous rights to culture and lands in customary international law).
218. Waitangi Tribunal, THE TARANAxI REPORT-KAuPAPA TUATAHi (1996), http://
www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/reports/downloadpdf.asp?ReportlD=3FECC540-D049-
4DE6-A7FO-C26BCCDAB345}. The report discusses Taranaki claim that confiscation of
traditional lands by the Crown during the nineteenth century wars and subsequent
lease of that land, officially reserved for Maori, to settlers a Treaty breaches. Id.
219. Id., ch. 2.1 (Partnership and Autonomy).
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the Tribunal quoted directly from Articles 21 to 39 of the then-
draft Declaration,220 and noted that parts of the draft Declara-
tion embodied principles of the Treaty.22' The Tribunal noted
that both the Declaration and the Treaty recognize the impor-
tance of land to indigenous populations and the legacy of colo-
nization. 222 The Tribunal noted that government-Maori rela-
tions were undeveloped 223 and concluded by stating that the
Declaration is an affirmation of the Treaty principles and assists
in the analysis of the relationship between indigenous peoples
and state governments. 224
The New Zealand Human Rights Commission ("NZHRC")
uses the Declaration as a standard against which it measures the
government's actions towards and with the Maori. 225  The
NZHRC, an independent organization under the Ministry of Jus-
tice, has the task of protecting human rights, as set forth in the
international covenants. 2 6 Despite New Zealand's vote against
the Declaration, the NZHRC uses the Declaration in its analysis
of the government's relationship with the Maori population.
227
220. Id., ch. 12 (Conclusions).
221. Id., ch. 12.1 (How Peoples Relate).
222. Id.
223. Id., ch. 2.1.
224. Id., ch. 12.2 (The Relationship in Taranaki).
225. New Zealand Human Rights Comm'n, supra note 151, quoting Race Relations
Commissioner Joris de Bres' recognition of the negative New Zealand vote but stating
that the Declaration remains a standard for looking at indigenous rights issues nation-
ally and internationally, and noting the Commission's intent to use the Declaration "to
further public discussion on the nature of indigenous rights, the Treaty of Waitangi and
the relationship between the Maori and the Crown").
226. See generally New Zealand Human Rights Comm'n, supra note 151 (stating
that the New Zealand Human Rights Commission ("NZHRC") was established in 1978
under the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and that its mandate was enlarged by
the Human Rights Act 1993); see also Core Document, supra note 4, 126; Joseph, supra
note 16, § 6.15.3.
227. See New Zealand Human Rights Comm'n, supra note 151 (recognizing with
regret New Zealand's no vote on the Declaration, but welcoming its approval by the
U.N. General Assembly and stating NZCHR's intention to use the Declaration); see also
New Zealand Comm'n on Human Rights, Treaty Developments Significant Over the
Past Year (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing the Declaration's adoption as
a positive development for indigenous populations worldwide and for interpretation
and application of the Treaty, and noting NZHRC planned to distribute copies of the
Declaration in Maori on Waitangi Day); New Zealand Human Rights Comm'n, United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Te Whakapuakitanga o te
Runanga Whakakotahi i nga Iwi o te Ao mo nga Tika o nga Iwi Taketake, http://www.
hrc.co.nz/hrc-new/hrc/cms/files/documents/30-Jan-200810-39-25_UNDeclaration
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III. CAN MAORIS USE THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO BOLSTER THEIR
LAND RIGHTS IN NEW ZEALAND?
New Zealand's vote against the Declaration was a step back-
wards for the realization of the partnership between the govern-
ment and the Maori envisioned in the Treaty. 228 Land is one
area that both illustrates and tests the partnership principle.
The government must consult and consent with Maori before
taking any actions which affect their rights, including those relat-
ing to land.2 9 The official mechanisms for resolution of land
claims under the Treaty purport to adhere to the partnership
principle.230 Yet, the enactment of the F.S.A. and the vote
against the Declaration show, the ideal of a partnership may be
lost to politics. 231
Although methods for redress are available under the
F.S.A., CERD found them to be discriminatory because Maori
are not able to secure title to the foreshore and seabed areas
where they can show traditional use and occupancy. 23 2 As the
Ngati Porou settlement illustrates, the F.S.A. procedures in prac-
tice do not remedy these perceived faults: the Ngati Porou re-
ceived recognition of their mana under the settlement, but seek-
ing legal title to the foreshore and seabed under the doctrine of
Maori customary title, found to exist in the Ngati Apa decision,
was not even a possibility. 233
Although international law plays a significant role in both
legislative and judicial actions in New Zealand, it is historically
_on-Rights-ofIndigenous.People.pdf (providing translation of the Declaration in Ma-
ori).
228. See supra notes 33, 109 and accompanying text (discussing the Treaty's estab-
lishment of a partnership between the parties, and the perceived incompatibility of the
Declaration with that partnership).
229. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing the steps the govern-
ment must take to comply with its Treaty obligations, including consulting with Maori
who will be affected by a government action).
230. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing land claim resolu-
tions through the Tribunal or settlement).
231. See supra notes 50-51, 107-09 and accompanying text (describing the political
motivations behind the F.S.A. and the vote against the Declaration).
232. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing CERD finding of
F.S.A. discrimination against Maori).
233. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text (discussing Ngati Porou settle-
ment's protection of mana and territorial customary rights but denial of ownership).
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missing from the process of resolution of Maori land claims. 234
The Ngati Porou settlement deed acknowledges the govern-
ment's obligation to comply with international law.235 Could
rights and principles found in customary international law have
furthered the claims of the Ngati Porou, allowing them to com-
plete the settlements with ownership, or something close?
Both Parliament and the courts are implicated in F.S.A. set-
tlements. The High Court must confirm a settlement deed of
agreement, and Parliament must allocate monies necessary to
implement any settlement that has been reached and subse-
quently approved by the Cabinet.236 Any F.S.A. settlement, con-
sequently, should be subject to the same international obliga-
tions that the courts and Parliament are obliged to follow. 237
Although New Zealand is not party to international instru-
ments on indigenous rights, customary international law is bind-
ing law in New Zealand. 23 18 This body of law includes principles
that address indigenous land rights.23 9 The indigenous land
rights that currently exist in customary international law are nar-
row, but include state protection of land that was traditionally
owned or occupied by indigenous peoples, as well as self-deter-
mination and cultural integrity. 4 ° The principle of state protec-
tion of indigenous land is already understood in New Zealand
through the existence of an array of mechanisms in place to in-
terpret and implement the Treaty. 241 The mana protected by
F.S.A. settlements is analogous to the rights to culture, property
234. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (stating that Treaty rights are pro-
tected under domestic, not international, law).
235. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting government obligation to
comply with international law stated in Deed of Agreement).
236. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (reciting steps that must be
taken after initialing of settlement Deed for it to be enacted).
237. See supra notes 181-217 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of
New Zealand's legislative and judicial branches to comply with international obliga-
tions).
238. See supra notes 186, 205-07 and accompanying text (discussing New Zealand's
courts' use of customary international law and stating that it is binding unless there is
clear legislative intent otherwise).
239. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Declaration as
embodying broad customary international law on indigenous land rights).
240. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing indigenous rights
located in customary international law).
241. See supra notes 109, 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing New Zealand
State practice relating to indigenous land rights).
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and self-determination located in customary international law.24 2
The Declaration is part of an emerging body of indigenous
rights principles. 243 The principles of the text embody broad no-
tions of respect for indigenous peoples' rights. 24 4 These rights
include a right of indigenous peoples to ownership of lands tra-
ditionally owned, occupied or used.24 5 It was this lacuna in the
F.S.A. that drew criticism in the CERD decision.2 46 This right to
ownership, if established as a principle of customary interna-
tional law, will become a principle that will be automatically
binding in New Zealand and will allow ownership where the
F.S.A. does not.
Successful invocation of the Declaration by Maori land
claimants has a clear barrier: New Zealand voted against the
Declaration, and made objections to specific articles and a gen-
eral statement that the Declaration is not binding law.24 7 New
Zealand's stated reasons for voting against the Declaration do
not make it a persistent objector to the general principles of the
Declaration. 248  The general principles of the text embody a
broad customary international law norm of indigenous peoples'
land rights. 24 9 At one point, New Zealand was willing to vote in
favor of the Declaration, and indeed, was a major participant in
its formation. 25" The principles of the Declaration are analo-
gous to those embodied in the Treaty.2 51 New Zealand's state
242. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing mana as the hapu's
"authority, control, influence, prestige and power," including a right to conduct and
regulate activities on the land).
243. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing the broad scope of
potential applicability of the Declaration).
244. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the Declaration's goal
of improving the relationship between States and their indigenous populations).
245. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Declaration Article 26,
reciting indigenous land rights).
246. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the CERD decision
that the F.S.A. discriminates against Maori by not allowing ownership of the foreshore
and seabed).
247. See supra notes 96-98, 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing objections of
New Zealand to particular articles and to the Declaration as an aspirational statement).
248. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (discussing limitation of New
Zealand's objections to specific articles and state practice contrary to those objections).
249. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the Declaration as an
embodiment of a broad right of indigenous peoples to land).
250. See supra notes 86, 160 and accompanying text (discussing New Zealand's role
in drafting the Declaration and subsequent reasons for a change in position).
251. See supra notes 111, 114-15 and accompanying text (discussing similarities of
rights protected by the Treaty to those stated in the Declaration).
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practice uphold the principles in the Declaration it purports to
find objectionable out of a sense of domestic, rather than inter-
national, legal obligation.
The government primarily directed its objections to the
right set forth in the Declaration that most strengthens Maori
land claims: the right to ownership of land based on traditional
use and occupancy. 25 2 Even by invoking the persistent objector
principle it is doubtful that New Zealand can prevent the forma-
tion of a binding customary international law right.2 3 A vast ma-
jority of States voted in favor of the Declaration. Moreover,
countries have acted to implement the Declaration into domes-
tic law and their courts have used it as proof of international
law. 2
54
Significantly, the Declaration is, and has been, used in New
Zealand, by bodies of the New Zealand government. Although it
has not been invoked by the courts, the NZHRC's and Waitangi
Tribunal's use of the Declaration illustrate two manners in which
the Declaration can be applied in New Zealand: as a guideline
for measuring laws and programs that affect Maori, and as a tool
of interpretation for the Treaty. 255 These uses of the Declaration
points to an emergence of the Declaration as a set of principles
by which governments, including New Zealand, can and do em-
ploy to guide their relationships with their indigenous popula-
tions.
The Ngati Porou settlement exposes the weaknesses of New
Zealand's objections to the Declaration by showing the short-
comings of New Zealand's domestic protections and illustrating
how the Declaration could strengthen the claim. The settlement
affirms Ngati Porou's collective mana to the disputed foreshore
and seabed, the traditional use of the land and provides in-
252. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing New Zealand's objec-
tions to rights relating to or having an effect on land).
253. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (discussing weakening of persis-
tent objector doctrine in face of near-unanimous international support and state prac-
tice by objector contrary to objection).
254. See supra notes 1, 3, 153, 162 and accompanying text (noting only four coun-
tries voted against the Declaration, two of which have since changed their position; two
countries have moved to implement the Declaration in their domestic law; and one
country's supreme court has invoked the Declaration as embodying general principles
of international law).
255. See supra notes 218-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Waitangi Tribu-
nal's and the NZHRC's use of the Declaration).
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creased management over these traditional lands.2 56 Although
the powers granted to the Ngati Porou hapu under the settle-
ment can be limited by (and any hapu decision made can be
overcome by) legislative action,25 v the government must consult
with and gain the consent of the Ngati Porou before taking any
action that directly affects their rights. 25s This mechanism en-
sures balance between the mana asserted by the hapu and legisla-
tive action.2 59 The objections of the government to the redress
provisions of the Declaration are particularly unfounded in light
of the Ngati Porou agreement, in which no demand for compen-
sation was made and the interests of third parties remained pro-
tected.2 60
The Ngati Porou settlement highlights the continued objec-
tions of the hapu to the F.S.A.'s denial of ownership rights. Also,
the decision of the hapu to enter into the settlement agreement
reflects the hapu's desire to have legal protection for their
mana.261' The F.S.A.'s limitation on ownership rights may be in
violation of developing norms of international law that give in-
digenous peoples the right to ownership of lands traditionally
owned, used and occupied. If so, the settlement agreement
could be challenged for violating its own terms, those in which
the government recites its obligations to international law.262 In-
voking the Declaration and principles of customary international
law will give teeth to future challenges of the F.S.A. as a violation
of international and domestic law. Maori land claimants, bring-
ing claims under the F.S.A. and to the Waitangi Tribunal, will
benefit from the addition of customary international law sup-
porting indigenous land rights to the their claims.
256. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing the rights protected
by the Deed of Agreement).
257. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of the
settlement rights).
258. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing the terms of the
agreement).
259, See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional con-
vention requiring government consultation of Maori).
260. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of pre-
serving rights to land, not money, to the settlement).
261. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing standing objection to
F.S.A. by Ngati Porou).
262. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting the government acknowl-
edgment of its international obligations in upholding the Deed of Agreement).
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CONCLUSION
Using the Declaration and principles of customary interna-
tional law will allow Maori land claimants to further their claims
to ownership of lands traditionally owned, used and occupied.
As the formation of international law and Treaty of Waitangi
claim resolutions are both very political processes, arguing that
customary international law supporting Maori right to owner-
ship of traditional lands is applicable in New Zealand tribunals,
may fail in the near future. The broad international support for
the Declaration, and use of the Declaration by authoritative bod-
ies in New Zealand, indicates indigenous rights will receive in-
creased protection on the international level. In New Zealand,
understanding indigenous rights in terms of domestic law as well
as international law will contribute to the realization of the part-
nership principles behind the Treaty of Waitangi.

